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I. INTRODUCTION
The Congress shall have the power...
(3) To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
(8) To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]1
"The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize through
copyright grants are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit."2
But trademarks are forever.3
This article makes several assertions:
(1) The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, even read
with the Commerce Clause, prevents Congress from giving authors or
inventors exclusive rights unbounded by premeasured time limitations;
(2) Because such limits exist, even incontestable trademarks must
be subject to functionality challenges in order to prevent conflict with
the Patent Clause;
(3) The Intellectual Property Clause requires a similar challenge
to prevent conflict with the Copyright Clause;
(4) The states are also limited by either direct constitutional
mandate or statutory preemption.
Based on the first two assertions, this article argues that the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp.4 is
unconstitutional. This outcome also highlights the importance of the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 8. Clause 3 is the Commerce Clause. Clause 8 contains
what are usually termed the Copyright and the Patent Clauses. For greater accuracy, see
discussion infra Section IV.C.I. I shall refer to the two clauses as the Intellectual Property
Clause. I use the singular form to parallel the singular usually used for the language containing
the three commerce clauses: the Foreign Nation Commerce Clause, the Interstate Commerce
Clause, and the Indian Tribes Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 190 (1989).
2. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
3. Epigram by author.
The copyright laws are based on an entirely different concept than the trademark laws,
and contemplate that the copyrighted material, like patented ideas, will eventually pass
into the public domain by mere passage of time.
Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975).
4. 9 F.3d 1091 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
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last two assertions. The ramifications of the third assertion are left to
another paper.
The fourth assertion is both the most interesting and the most
theoretical. The latter part of this Article suggests that states are
directly limited by the Intellectual Property Clause, especially if
Congress passes any legislation under that Clause. This outcome may
be considered to rest on (1) statutory/constitutional preemption created
by the Intellectual Property Clause in combination with any federal
legislation under that Clause, or (2) narrow constitutional preemption
by the Intellectual Property Clause acting alone, or (3) a dormant
Intellectual Property Clause,' or (4) the intersection of the Intellectual
Property Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause. However
analyzed, Congress is constitutionally barred from removing this
limitation.
Finally, this Article asserts that in an "evolving Constitution," the
best reading of "limited times" may be "limited in relation to the
economic life of the res." 6
II. THE TRIGGERING CASE: SHAKESPEARE V. SILSTAR
7
Shakespeare and Silstar are competing manufacturers of fishing
rods.' Shakespeare sued Silstar for trademark infringement.9 Silstar
defended and counterclaimed, requesting cancellation of Shakespeare's
mark.10
Shakespeare had obtained federal registration and incontestable
status for a mark that consisted of "a whitish-translucent, or clear, tip
5. Thanks to Judge Kozinski, the only federal judge, so far, to use the term "dormant
Copyright Clause" in an on-line opinion. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds Library (April 27,
1994); see White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir.) ("Under the
dormant Commerce Clause, state intellectual property laws can stand only so long as they don't
'prejudice the interests of other States."' (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558
(1973)) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
6. While this is merely a side-issue in the current paper, I strongly suggest it warrants
serious and immediate consideration.
7. Shakespeare raises other issues, fascinating to a trademark specialist, which are beyond the
scope of this paper: the relationship between the grounds for cancellation available to courts and
the PTO, whether available weapons against incontestable marks are substantive or merely change
the evidentiary weight of the registration, and whether the existence of collateral use empowers
unlisted weapons when a counterclaimant requests judicial cancellation of incontestable marks.
8. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1389-90 (D.S.C. 1992), rev'd, 9 F.3d
1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
9. Id. at 1389 (under § 32(1) of the Lanham Act of 1946 ("The Lanham Act"), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,




Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 18:259
portion of the rod, combined with an opaque rod base."" This
trademarked appearance is not primarily a product of aesthetic choice;
it is the natural result of making a rod with a hollow graphite tube and
a solid fiberglass tip-a superior combination of material that creates
a strong, flexible, light-weight fishing rod. Leaving the tip clear or
transparent and the base opaque is the cheapest way of making a
superior rod because the manufacturer does not incur the expense of
adding coloring.12  The configuration also makes the rod's superior
construction clearly visible to a consumer." Shakespeare's "mark" is,
therefore, "functional" as defined in trademark law. 4 Based on this
conclusion, the district court ordered the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) to cancel the mark's registration. The Fourth Circuit re-
versed-unconstitutionally."5
III. BACKGROUND STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW
A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or any combination
thereof used in commerce by a person to identify the goods or services
of that person. 6 Trademark law protects consumers' mental associa-
tion between the source of a product and the product itself. This
allows consumers to easily locate goods of known quality and motivates
suppliers to offer high quality merchandise. 7
11. Id. at 1388.
12. Id. at 1390-91.
13. Id. at 1391. But see Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Silstar
Corp. v. Shakespeare Co., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1568) ("Shakespeare takes
multiple steps in its conscious alteration of an already existing public domain method of
manufacture to produce the unique appearance of its 'dear tip' configuration. It adds a dual color
bath .... ).
14. See Shakespeare, 802 F. Supp. at 1398.
15. Id. at 1398-99, rev'd, 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 2134 (1994).
This description oversimplifies. The district court decided first that Silstar's was a "fair use";
second, that this conclusion lowered the evidentiary level of the registration from conclusive to
prima facie, thus allowing functionality to be considered; third, that the mark was functional;
fourth, that a court had the power to order cancellation of a functional mark under these
circumstances even if the mark was incontestable.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This definition combines the Lanham Act
definitions of "trademarks" and "service marks." The Lanham Act also defines "certification
marks" and "collective marks." All are induded in the statutory term 'marks.' For the purposes
of this Article, the technical definitions and distinctions are unimportant. Unless otherwise
specified, I shall follow the usage of attorneys who do not specialize in intellectual property law
and use "trademark" to mean any type of "mark" defined in the Lanham Act or an unregistered
"mark" protected by Lanham Act section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
However, only registered trademarks may become incontestable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 182 (1949). Economic analysis confirms the ties between legal
trademark protection, search costs, and incentives to offer quality goods. See William M. Landes
1995] Unconstitutional Incontestability?
A. Mere Descriptiveness1"
Words, names, symbols, and devices presented to courts or the
PTO as "marks" are commonly separated into categories originally
created by Judge Friendly: 9 generic,2" descriptive, suggestive, and
arbitrary or fanciful.21 These categories are unclearly marked sections
of a continuum from clear indications of product nature to clear
indications of product source.22
Marks that merely describe a product are not inherently distinctive
and do not inherently identify a particular source. Therefore, under
most circumstances, they cannot be protected. However, descriptive
marks may acquire enough distinctiveness to be protected.23
No one has ever created a clear test to determine whether a mark
is "merely descriptive" or "suggestive." The distinction is very
important because "suggestive" marks, as opposed to "merely
descriptive" marks, can be protected without a showing of acquired
distinctiveness.24 One test looks at the role played by imagination:
"A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception
to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods. A term is
descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients,
& Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-80
(1987).
18. Because this Article is limited to the constitutional issues, Sections I and II supply only
the minimal information needed to understand those issues.
19. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
20. Generic terms are the common name of the type of product and are never protectible
as marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (3) (1988). "A generic term is one that refers to the genus of
which the particular product is a species." Park N' Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 194 (1985). Words held generic include: shredded wheat (claimed as a mark by
Kellogg Co.), Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); aspirin (formally a
common-law mark owned by Bayer), Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921);
and cellophane (formerly a trademark of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.), DuPont Cellophane
Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 575 (1938). Marks which the reader may remember as having been at least on the verge of
becoming generic include Xerox (photocopy) and Kleenex (paper tissue).
21. For example, EXXON or XEROX, which were coined by their holders.
22. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757 (1992); J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11.01 (3d ed. 1993).
The type and imprecision of these categories is a reasonable economic choice. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 17, at 287-96.
23. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(Registration on the principle register may be denied if the element "when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive ... of them," but such an
element may be registered if it has "become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce.").
24. Technically called "secondary meaning." See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 11.09.
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qualities or characteristics of the goods. '2' Another test considers
whether or not competitors need the term to indicate the nature of
their goods. 26 A third test focuses on the extent to which competitors
already use the term.27
Marks that courts have held "descriptive" include KING SIZE
(clothing for larger men),2" FINELINE (for mechanical pencils),29
BUFFERIN (for buffered aspirin),3" and CONTINUOUS PROG-
RESS (for educational materials).3 Marks held "suggestive" include
CITIBANK (for an urban bank),32 COPPERTONE (for sun tan
oil),33 LOC-TOP (for bottle closure caps),34 and MATERNALLY
YOURS (for maternity clothing shop).35
B. Functionality
"In general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential
to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of
25. Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfg., 295 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 442 F.2d 979 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
27. See, e.g., In re Quick-Print Copy Shops, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 624 (T.T.A.B.), affd, 616
F.2d 523 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The American Law Institute's drafts have elements of all three tests,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMP. § 14 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990) (not
acknowledging that the tests may lead to conflicting outcomes, see, e.g., id. § 16 crt. b, illus. 3
(container of liquid drain opener in the shape of a pipe trap is inherently distinctive even though
this is the dosest possibility of a physical description for a container, with the possible exception
of a plunger-shaped bottle)). These tests, and these categories of marks, were created in an age
when word marks predominated. Acceptance of packages and the configuration of the goods
themselves as marks strains the system. The Supreme Court's decision that unregistered trade
dress may be protected without a showing of secondary meaning exacerbates this problem. See
Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. 2753. I will leave the perplexities of when a non-word mark is "merely
descriptive" to another article.
28. King-Size, Inc. v. Frank's King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
29. In re W.A. Scheaffer Pen Co., 158 F.2d 390 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
30. Wise v. Bristol-Myers Co., 107 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
31. Educational Dev. Corp. v. Economy Co., 562 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1977).
32. Citibank, N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984).
33. Douglas Labs. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
968 (1954).
34. In re Polytop Corp., 167 U.S.P.Q. 383 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
35. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
Readers who find the court rulings regarding "descriptive" or "suggestive" difficult to coordinate
are in good company. Consider the multiple opinions discussing whether SKINVISIBLE, used
as a mark for transparent bandaging tape, is distinctive, or, as the court held, suggestive.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
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the article. 36  Functional features are not protectible as trade-
marks.37
[T]he concept of functionality can be given a precise economic
meaning. A nonfunctional feature, a feature that can be trade-
marked, is one with perfect (or nearly perfect) substitutes, so that a
property right will create no deadweight loss .... But if the feature
lacks good substitutes, either because the product is worth less
without it (the circular tire) or because it makes the product cheaper
to produce ([the cheapest] container shape), trademark protection
will be denied."
No reference to "functionality" appears in the Lanham Act. The
courts have refused to grant trademark protection to "functional"
features. This judicial fiat sensibly prevents exclusive property in the
"useful arts" without the need to meet the high criteria of the utility
patent statutes and without the time limitations imposed on patent
rights.3 9  Congress has never spoken on this particular issue. The
PTO, however, accepts the functionality doctrine and its policy
rationale. ° Although the Supreme Court has never directly consid-
36. Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982); see also Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (noting that the pillow-shape of a shredded wheat
biscuit is functional because "the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality
lessened if some other form were substituted for the pillow-shape.").
This article does not discuss the disputed esoterica of aesthetic functionality. Compare
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) (creating doctrine) with
MCCARTHY, supra, note 22, § 7.26[4][b], at 7-137 to 7-138 ("[T]he majority of courts have
rejected the theory of aesthetic functionality with varying degrees of zeal."). Nor does this article
discuss communicative functionality. But see Ma~la Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When
Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain-With an Example From the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1391, 1412-34 (1993) (suggesting doctrine).
Neither aesthetic functionality nor communicative functionality present the constitutional problem
addressed in this article.
37. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2760 (1992) (dicta);
Nabisco, 305 U.S. at 122 (alternative holding); MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 7.26 [1] (listing
multiple cases).
38. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 265.
39. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paralex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The
purpose of the rule precluding trademark significance is to prevent the grant of a perpetual
monopoly to features which cannot be patented . ... Products or features which have not
qualified for patent protection but which are functional are in the public domain are fair game for
imitation and copying."); see also In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A.
1982); Vaughn Mfg. C. v. Brikam Int'l Inc., 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987); MCCARTHY, supra
note 22, § 7.26(1].
40. If something is de jure functional it cannot be registered .... The refusal made
in such a situation is based on §§ 1, 2 and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051,
1052 and 1127, on the ground that the matter does not function as a mark. The refusal
rests, however, upon the foundation of effective competition. If a design is so highly
utilitarian in nature as to be the best or one of the few superior designs available,
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ered the rule's legitimacy, the Court has assumed its legitimacy in
several cases.41
C. Incontestably-Registered Trademarks
Trademarks that distinguish the goods of one business42 can be
registered on the principle register of the PTO.43 If a trademark (1)
is registered on the principle register, (2) is currently used in com-
merce, (3) has been both registered and used in commerce for the
immediately preceding five consecutive years, and (4) is not generic,44
a mere filing with the PTO transforms it into an incontestably-
registered mark ("incontestable mark").4' According to federal
statute, the registration of an incontestable mark is "conclusive
evidence" of the trademark's validity, of the validity of its registration,
of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's
recognition of that design as a trademark would hinder competition .... Thus the
refusal has more to do with public policy than it has to do with § 1, 2 and 45 of the
Act.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 1202.03(A)(i)(C) (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter TMEP].
41. See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758; Inwood, 456 U.S. at 844; Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122.
42. The term "person" or any other word or term used to designate the applicant or
other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of [the
Lanham] Act includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term "juristic
person" includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable
of suing and being sued in a court of law.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
43. Subject to certain statutory exceptions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-54 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
44. For definition, see supra note 20.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988) (for the goods or services for which it has been continuously
used and registered for five years); see also Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 127
U.S.P.Q. 42 (N.D. I1M. 1960) (so interpreting § 1065), modified on other grounds, 293 F.2d 88 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961). To be exact, only the "right to use the mark," not the
mark itself, becomes incontestable. 15 U.S.C. § 1065. Additional qualifications for incontestabili-
ty are:
(1) there has been no final decision adverse to registrant's claim of ownership of the
mark for such goods and services, or to registrant's right to register the same or to keep
the same on the register; and
(2) there is no proceeding involving said rights pending in the Patent and
Trademark office or in a court and not finally disposed of.
Id.
An incontestable mark has no exclusion power to the extent that it "infringes a valid right
acquired under the law of any State or Territory by use of a mark or trade name continuing from
a date prior to the date of registration under [the Lanham] Act of such mark." Id.
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exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.46 Incontestability is a
method of quieting title to the trademark.' 7
Incontestable marks are not inviolate, but they are less open to
challenge than other marks. The Lanham Act lists a limited number
of challenges available against an incontestable mark:
(1) the registrant obtained the registration or incontestable right
by fraud,"8
(2) the registrant abandoned the mark,' 9
(3) the mark, under the aegis of the registrant, is being used for
misrepresentation of the source of goods or services,o
(4) the allegedly infringing mark is being used collaterally, i.e.
descriptively, rather than as a mark,"1
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988). This conclusive weight is limited to those goods or services
covered by the registration and any renewals. Id.
47. Park N' Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 ("The incontestability provisions, as the proponents of the
Lanham Act emphasized, provide a means for the registrant to quiet title in the ownership of his
mark."). This has been challenged as inaccurate and as masking a lack of analysis. See Kenneth
L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REv. 519, 544 (1993) and
sources cited in accompanying notes.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(1) (1988).
49. Id. § 1115(b)(2).
50. Id. § 1115(b)(3); see also id. §§ 1064, 1065 (1988). Similar defenses exist against a
specialized type of mark called a "certification mark." Certification marks are used by persons
other than the registrants of the certification mark. A certification mark represents the registrant's
"certiffication] [of the goods' or services'] regional or other origin, mode of manufacture, quality,
accuracy, or other characteristic... [,] or that the work or labor on the goods or services was
performed by members of a union or other organization." Id. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
An incontestable certification mark can be challenged on grounds that (1) it is being "used
so as to represent falsely that the owner or a user thereof makes or sells the goods or performs the
services on or in connection with which such mark is used," or (2) that
the registrant (A) does not control, or is not able legitimately to exercise control over,
the use of such mark, or (B) engages in the production or marketing of any goods or
services to which the certification mark is applied, or (C) permits the use of the
certification mark for purposes other than to certify, or (D) discriminately refuses to
certify or to continue to certify the goods or services of any person who maintains the
standards or conditions which such mark certifies.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1054, 1064, 1065 (1988).
51. That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use,
otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the
individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services
of such party, or their geographic origin.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988). For example, a repair shop may advertise that it specializes in
fixing Volkswagen cars, provided that it does not imply it is authorized to do so by Volkswagen.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, supplemental opinion, 413 F.2d 1126
(9th Cir. 1969). A perfume manufacturer may use advertising comparing his scents and prices
to those of a more expensive business, provided consumers are not confused. Smith v. Chanel,
Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
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(5) the allegedly infringing mark has temporal priority within a
limited geographic area,
s2
(6) the registered mark is (or has been) used to violate federal
antitrust law,
5 3
(7) equitable principles such as latches, estoppel, or acquiescence
protect the alleged infringer,
54
(8) the mark is generic, 5
(9) the mark has been abandoned by the registrant, 6 or
(10) the mark contains material intrinsically unacceptable under
the Lanham Act.
57
Mere descriptiveness and functionality, two extremely potent
weapons against other marks, are not listed in the statutory armory for
use against incontestable marks. This Article argues that the absence
of mere descriptiveness raises a constitutional problem under the
Copyright Clause and that the absence of functionality raises a
constitutional problem under the Patent Clause.
Mere descriptiveness and functionality differ in one important
respect: the surety of their unavailability. Mere descriptiveness is
addressed by the text of the Lanham Act;5  its exclusion from the list
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5), (6). The technical details are not relevant to this Article. The
junior user is allowed to keep limited rights obtained by use (or use and registration) before the
registrant's rights matured under the Lanham Act. Id.
53. Id. § 1115(b)(7).
54. Id. § 1115(b)(8).
55. Id. §§ 1064, 1065.
56. Id.
57. For example, the mark:
(a) consists of or compromises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute[,or]
(b) [c]onsists of or compromises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United
States or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation
thereoflor]
(c) [c]onsists of or compromises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular
living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a
deceased President of the of the United States during the life of his widow, if any,
except by the written consent of the widow.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), (b), (c), 1064(3), 1065 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods
of others shall be refused registration on the principle register on account of its nature unless it
(e) [c]onsists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or (2) when
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them ....
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section,
nothing herein shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce.
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of challenges available against an incontestable mark is, therefore,
unmistakably a congressional choice. 9 Functionality, however, is
entirely a judicial creation.
The District Court opinion in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. was
the first case to reach functionality's relationship to incontestable
marks.6" On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's
cancellation of the mark because functionality is not listed in the
Lanham Act as a ground upon which a court may order cancellation
of an incontestable mark.61 Silstar petitioned in vain for certiorari on
the constitutional issue62 of whether a trademark registered under the
Lanham Act can provide a perpetual patent-like monopoly for a
functional feature of a product in light of the constitutional limitation
on such perpetual monopolies set forth in Article I, Section 8, Clause
8 of the United States Constitution, and in light of the entire history
of trademark law to the contrary.6"
15 U.S.C. § 1052. The effect of this statutory language is that "words which are merely
descriptive of the qualities, ingredients, or composition of an article cannot be appropriated as a
trademark and are not entitled to protection unless they have acquired secondary meaning."
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1961). "The basic
element of secondary meaning is... the mental association by a substantial segment of consumers
and potential consumers between the alleged mark and a single source of the product." Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
59. See Park N' Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1985)
(discussing legislative history) ("The statutory provisions that ... do not allow an incontestable
mark to be challenged on [the] ground [of mere descriptiveness] cannot be attributed to
inadvertence by Congress.").
60. 9 F.3d 1091, 1092, 1096-97 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994). But
see Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), affd
on other grounds, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972). Schwinn is cited in Anthony L. Fletcher,
Incontestability and Constructive Notice: A Quarter Century of Adjudication, 63 TRADEMARK REP.
71, 97 (1973) (describing Schwinn as using functionality to deny enforcement of an incontestable
mark). Fletcher misreads Schwinn. The Schwinn court held against the plaintiff, the holder of
an incontestable mark, on the ground that the alleged mark was functional. However, the
relationship between incontestability and functionality was not addressed. The Schwinn court
considered incontestability irrelevant because of the doctrine (followed by some, but not all,
circuits) that incontestability cannot be used offensively. This offensive/defensive distinction was
finally destroyed by Park N' Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (incontestability
may be used offensively). For the history of the distinction, see Port, supra note 47, at 545-47.
61. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 9 F.3d 1091, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2134 (1994). The Fourth Circuit also disagreed with other aspects of the district court
opinion and remanded for reconsideration of several issues. Id. at 1098-99. Judge Nieymeyer
dissented; he saw the issue as the importance of functionality and alluded to, though did not
stress, the constitutional time limit set for control of patentable subject matter. Id. at 1099-1106.
62. The petition also requested review of "[w]hether 15 U.S.C. § 1119 provides authority
for a federal court to cancel a trademark on the ground that it applies to a functional feature."
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Shakespeare, 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1568).
63. Id.
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The Supreme Court declined to answer Silstar's question. This
Article answers the question: No.
This Article argues only that the Fourth Circuit's reading of the
Lanham Act creates a constitutional problem. I leave for another
article whether the reading is the correct statutory interpretation 64 or
the better policy choice.
IV. CONGRESS MAY NOT BY PASS THE "LIMITED TIMES"
PROVISION IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE THROUGH
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Anyone who suggests a constitutional limit on Congressional
power needs to address whether the proposed limit is overcome by a
different section of the Constitution. The Commerce Clause might
easily allow Congress to pass statutes that could not be authorized by
the Intellectual Property Clause.
A. Other Clauses as Limits on the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause, while expansive, does have outer limits
6
even though its range has grown significantly over time. In 1879, the
clause could not ground trademark legislation that did not expressly
exclude marks used in commerce between citizens of the same state.
66
By 1942, it covered regulation of grain intended, not for sale, but for
consumption on the farm where it was produced.6 7  Yet "Congress
may not ... transcend specific limitations on its exercise of the
commerce power that are imposed by other provisions of the Constitu-
tion."68
Under certain circumstances, other Constitutional provisions may
act as limits upon the Commerce Clause. These include the Bankrupt-
cy Clause, and the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Twenty-first Amendments.
These various provisions have kept Congress from utilizing the
Commerce Clause as a means to avoid the provisions' requirements.
64. Because the statute has a clear severability clause, the court could easily have held the
statute unconstitutional only as applied to functional, incontestable marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be affected thereby.").
65. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1387 (1987) (providing an overview of the history of the clause's expansion and arguing that
the Commerce Clause had been over-expanded even before the New Deal, but agreeing that both
reliance interests and lack of a good theory on when correcting past errors is justified militate
against returning to a correct reading).
66. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96-97 (1879).
67. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
68. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The words "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States '69 bars a statute which "applies only to one debtor and [which]
can be enforced only by the one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction
over that debtor.
70
Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause contains an
affirmative limitation or restriction upon Congress' power:
Bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the United States.
Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not required by
the Commerce Clause. Thus, if Congress had the power to enact
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, a
limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws would
be eradicated from the Constitution. It is therefore necessary for us
to determine the nature of the uniformity required by the Bankrupt-
cy Clause. 1
Commerce Clause limitations based on the Tenth Amendment 2
seemingly exist, but their extent has been clouded, not clarified, by
recent Court decisions. In 1976, National League of Cities v. Usery
"drew from the Tenth Amendment an 'affirmative limitation on the
exercise of [congressional power under the Commerce Clause] akin to
other commerce power affirmative limitations contained in the
Constitution.""' 3 In 1983, this constraint was loosened by EEOC v.
Wyoming, 4 and in 1985, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 4.
70. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982). But see Douglas
G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon,
1982 SuP. CT. REV. 25, 30.
71. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468-69 (Rehnquist, J.).
72. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
73. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983) (op. for the court, Brennan, J., construing
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976) (Congress' Commerce Clause power
does not encompass placing minimum wage and maximum hour limitations on state employees
involved in traditional state-government functions)).
74. Compare EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 239 (ADEA as applied to game wardens does
not meet National League of Cities' three part test for invalidity because the ADEA does not
"directly impair the State's ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions.") (citation and internal quotations omitted) (op. for the court, Brennan,
J.) with id. at 248 ("The only basis for questioning the federal statute at issue here is the pure
judicial fiat found [in National League of Cities.] Neither the Tenth Amendment, nor any other
provision of the Constitution, affords any support for that judicially constructed limitation on the
scope of the federal power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.") (Stevens, J., concur-
ring):
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Authority7" overruled National League of Cities.76 The Garcia Court
continued "to recognize that the States occupy a special and specific
position in our constitutional system" and that "the scope of Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position."77
The Court trusted that "[t]he political process [generally] ensures that
laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated"78 and
declined to "identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional
structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the
Commerce Clause. '79  In 1991, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,8" Justice
O'Connor,"' writing for the Court, imposed a plain statement
requirement on any congressional attempt to cover state judges under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The requirement
partially rested on "avoid[ing] a potential constitutional problem"
because, as compared to "Congress' powers [t]o regulate Commerce
* . .among the several States," 2 the "authority of the people of the
States to determine the qualifications of their government officials may
be inviolate," trumping Congress's authority.8 3
Clarification, or further mystification, 4 on this issue may be
imminent. On April 18, 1994, the Court granted certiorari to answer
the question whether the "Commerce Clause empower[s] Congress to
enact [18 U.S.C.] Section 922(q) [the Gun-Free School Zone Act of
75. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
76. Id. at 557. But see id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J, dissenting) ("I am confident [that the
principle of National League of Cities will] in time again command the support of a majority of
this Court.").
77. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also id. at 552 ("State sovereign interests ... are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power.").
80. 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that state judges are not covered by the ADEA).
81. O'Connor dissented in Garcia. 469 U.S. at 580.
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463. The Court continued this line of cases in New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2428 (1992) (holding that the federal government may not "comman-
deer[]" state legislatures by forcing any state without a timely formulated plan dealing with
disposal of radioactive waste to take title to the waste); see also Printz v. United States, 854 F.
Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994) (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act's requirement that local
police officers check gun purchaser's backgrounds is unconstitutional commandeering). But see
Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (opposite result).
84. Cf. Edwin L. Rubin & Malcolm Freeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing that federalism is largely an historical anachronism




1990], which makes it a federal offense to possess firearm[s] within
1,000 feet of [a] school.""5
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause rendered unconstitu-
tional the presumption of knowledge embedded into the Marijuana Tax
Act.86 The Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury rendered
unconstitutional the death penalty created by the Federal Kidnapping
Act.87 Justice O'Connor stated, though not for the Court, that the
Twenty-First Amendment prevents federal legislation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause to set minimum drinking ages. 8
In contrast to the above limitations on the Commerce Clause, the
Court allowed circumnavigation of the Taxing Clause through the
channel of the Commerce Clause in the Head Money Cases89 of 1884.
An impost of fifty cents per immigrant passenger was held a valid
exercise of the Commerce Clause despite the argument that this was
a tax implicitly barred by the Constitution's linkage of taxes to the
general welfare. 90
85. United States v. Lopez, 62 U.S.L.W. 3645 (quotation is from U.S.L.W.), 2 F.3d 1342
(5th Cir. 1993) (Tenth Amendment bars Congress passing such legislation under its Commerce
Clause authority; in the alternative, even if Congress had power to pass the statute, defendant's
conviction must be reversed for failure to allege and prove any connection between his possession
of a gun in a school and interstate commerce), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994)
(No. 93-1260). But see United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993) (statute is within
Congress' Commerce Clause power), petition for cert. filed March 25, 1994 (No. 93-8487).
Similarly, one court has recently held that part of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act,
18 U.S.C. § 248 et. seq., is unconstitutional on federalism and 10th Amendment grounds, despite
contrary precedent. See United States v. Wilson, -F. Supp.-, 1995 WL 114802, *4 n.8, *11
(E.D. Wis. March 16, 1995).
86. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841 (construing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
31 (1969)). The due process holding in Leary deals with a statutory presumption that a defendant
knows marijuana in his possession had been illegally imported into the United States. Leary, 395
U.S. at 30, 37.
87. National League of Cities. 426 U.S. at 841, (construing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968)). The statute at issue erred by providing a possible death penalty only to defendants
who chose to go to trial. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571.
88. "[T]he regulation of the age of the purchasers of liquor, just as the regulation of the price
at which liquor may be sold, falls squarely within the scope of those powers reserved to the States
by the Twenty-First Amendment .... Accordingly, Congress simply lacks power under the
Commerce Clause to displace state regulation of this kind." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
218 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority did not reach this issue because they
validated the limit under the Spending Power. Id. at 206. But see Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1984) (Twenty-First Amendment does not allow state protectionism of the
local liquor industry over a dormant commerce clause violation).
89. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
90. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 1 ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States"). See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 at 431-32 (1985) (criticizing this use of the
Commerce Clause). A better basis for the Court's judgment would have been its dicta:
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Seemingly, if a separate constitutional phrase (1) includes a limit
by negative implication, and (2) this limit has not been interpreted out
of the clause, Congress cannot by pass the limit through the Commerce
Clause. As discussed immediately below, the "limited times"
provision in the Intellectual Property Clause fills these requirements.91
B. The Meaning of "Limited Times" in the Intellectual
Property Clause
The Congress shall have the power...
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries[.]92
The Intellectual Property Clause, while relatively clear on its face,
lacks a clear, contemporaneous pedigree or explication. However,
nothing suggests the words "limited times" were intended in some
counterintuitive sense for policy reasons. 93 Nor does the current
vision of the Clause's policy justification counsel interpreting it
counterintuitively.94
According to James Madison's notes, David Brearley suggested
the final wording of the clause to the Constitutional Convention on
September 5, 1787, speaking for the Committee on Unfinished
If it were necessary to prove that the imposition of this contribution on owners of ships
is made for the general welfare of the United States, it would not be difficult to show
that it is so, and particularly that it is among the means which Congress may deem
necessary and proper for that purpose; and beyond this we are not permitted to inquire.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595.
91. But cf. Pierre N. Leval & Lewis Liman, Are Copyrights for Authors or Their Children?,
39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. USA 1, 4 n.14 (1991) (concluding without analysis that "contemporary
understanding of Congress' Commerce Clause power surely encompasses the power to pass such
a statute" giving copyrights to non-authors).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
93. But see discussion infra notes 130-49 and accompanying text. Compare Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) ("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure
the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in
the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact") (holding constitutional a Maryland
statute allowing an alleged child abuse victim to testify by one-way dosed circuit television). But
see id. at 870 ("The Court has convincingly proved that the Maryland procedure serves a valid
interest, and gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause guarantees
(everything, that is, except confrontation). I am persuaded, therefore, that the Maryland
procedure is virtually constitutional ... [It is not, however, actually constitutional.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. However, modem understanding of economics may counsel changing the way we
calculate the time limit, see infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
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Business. 5 Brearley did so in response to Madison's suggestion "[t]o
secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time," and also
to two suggestions by Charles C. Pinckney: "[t]o grant patents for
useful inventions," and "[t]o secure to authors exclusive rights for a
certain time."96
We have no record of any discussion about the clause. There was
no debate on the floor of the Constitutional Convention, and minutes
95. See also Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 438, 442 (1929) (On "Wednesday, September 5, 1787,... Mr. Brearley
of the Committee of Eleven, made a further report as follows: 'To promote the progress of
Science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries.' (A footnote in the journal here says that the word
'the' is inserted in the transcript between 'and' and 'useful.')").
96. ARTHUR T. PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 529 (1941) (a
rearrangement of Madison's notes giving consecutive development of provisions in the
Constitution) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fenning, supra note 95, at 442 ("General
Pinckney proposed, for the Committee [of detail], 'to grant patents for useful inventions; to secure
to authors exclusive rights for certain ['limited' stricken out] time."' (bracketed material in
original)). Pinckney is credited with the first suggestion of both patent and copyright. 1 GEORGE
T. CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THEIR DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CLOSE OF THEIR CIVIL WAR 531 (1889) ("The subjects of patents
for useful inventions and of copyrights of authors appear to have been brought forward by Mr.
Charles Pinckney;" no authority given) [hereinafter CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]; 2
GEORGE T. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION AND ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH NOTICES OF ITS PRINCIPAL FRAMERS 339
(1858) (same wording) [hereinafter CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN]. But see ROBERT P.
MERGES, PATENT LAW & POLICY 7 (1992) (crediting Jefferson with authorship of the
constitutional Patent Clause; no authority given); Fenning, supra note 95, at 440-41 (crediting
Madison with first mention of copyright, but not patent). While Fenning provides the most
detail on the movement of the proposal through the Constitutional Convention, he concludes that
"[iut seems impossible to fix definitely on whose brow the laurel wreath should be placed either
for the general suggestion or for the specific phraseology of the patent and copyright clause [sic]
of the Constitution." Id. at 445.
Madison's notes also record several rejected alternatives on the same or related subjects:
MADISON: It should be provided that the government have power to encourage
by premiums and provisions the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.
PINCKNEY: Power should be given the government to establish public
institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades
and manufactures.
PINCKNEY: The government should have power to establish seminaries for the
promotion of literature and the arts and sciences.
MADISON: Congress should be enabled to establish a university in the place of
the general government, and should possess exclusive jurisdiction over the institution.
It should be specified that all persons might be admitted to the university and to its
honors and emoluments, without any distinction of religion whatever.
JAMES MADISON, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAFF: REJECTED SUGGESTIONS OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, WITH EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT 64 (Jane Butzner comp.,
1941).
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of the committee deliberations, if made, have not survived.97 "The
matter, on its merits, apparently aroused substantially no controversy
either in the Convention or among the States adopting the Constitu-
tion."' 8
Madison's apologia in the FEDERALIST is silent on time limita-
tions:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right
at common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal
reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides
in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most
of them have anticipated the decision on this point by laws passed
at the insistence of Congress.99
The referenced "insistence" of the Continental Congress, however,
was not silent on the matter of time periods. The Congress recom-
mended that the several states pass copyright legislation creating an
initial term of protection of "not less than fourteen years" followed by
a renewal term of "not less than fourteen years." Thus, the Continen-
tal Congress recommended a lower limit, without mentioning the
desirability of an upper time limit, but clearly assumed that a time
limit would be named in each statute. 1°0 By the time of the Consti-
97. See Fenning, supra note 95, at 443; 2 CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, supra note 96,
at 339 ("The subjects of patents for useful inventions and of copyrights of authors .. gave rise
to no discussion in the Convention, but were considered in a grand committee, with other matters,
and there is no account of the views which they took of this interesting branch of the powers of
Congress."); see also Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir.
1955) ("So far as I know, there is nothing to show what took place in the Convention.") (Hand,
J., dissenting); MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [A] (1994) (committee
discussion was secret) [hereinafter NIMMER].
98. Fenning, supra note 95, at 443 (no authority cited). The index to Jonathan Elliot's
compilation of state debates on the Constitution includes no reference to the Intellectual Property,
Copyright, or Patent Clause. 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1836).
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 186 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed. 1894).
100. On the report of a committee, consisting of Mr. [Hugh] Williamson, Mr. [Ralph]
Izard and Mr. [James] Madison, to whom where referred sundry papers and memorials
on the subject of literary property ... being persuaded that nothing is more properly
a man's own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of literary
property would greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries and to
the general extension of arts and commerce .... [the Congress] [rlesolved [t]hat it be
recommended to the several states, to secure to the authors or publishers of any new
books not hitherto printed, being citizens of the United States, and to their executors,
administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for a certain time, not less than
fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall
survive the term first mentioned, and to their executors, administrators and assigns, the
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tutional Convention, most of the states had passed copyright legisla-
tion. All such statutes contained express term limits.'O
Patents in the pre-Constitution United States also seem to have
been granted only for set periods of time.'0 2 While the Continental
Congress did not request the states to create patent legislation, South
Carolina's copyright statute also granted patent rights:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the
inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of
making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen
years, under the same privileges and restrictions hereby granted to,
and imposed on, the authors of books.'0 3
In other states, patents were granted individually by special acts of the
legislature. While the lengths of the grants varied, all seem to have
been for set periods of time."
copyright of such books for another term of time not less than fourteen years, such copy
or exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending the same, to be secured to the
original authors, or publishers, their executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws
and under restrictions as to the several states may seem proper.
24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326-27 (1922) (emphasis added; internal
footnotes and indentations omitted).
101. By 1786, all the original states except Delaware had passed copyright statutes of some
kind. All contained express term limits: North Carolina had a fourteen year term, New
Hampshire had 20 year term, three states had a 21 year term (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Virginia), and seven states had a fourteen year term followed by a renewal term of an additional
fourteen years (Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Georgia, and
New York). COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULLETIN
NO. 3, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783
RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 1-21 (1973) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS]; see also Karl
Fenning, Copyright Before the Constitution, 17 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 379, 381 (1935). In 1672,
without mentioning a time limit, the Massachusetts Bay Colony granted John Usher, who had
printed the colonies' laws at his own expense, the right to collect a fee from anyone else who
printed copies of this work; however, the next year the grant was limited to seven years. See
BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 65-66 (1967).
102. In discussing the historical material, the term "patent" will be used to refer to a
government grant of a right to exclude others from some use of a new invention. Historically,
patents meant any grant by a sovereign which was open for inspection by the public and included
other revenue-generating grants, such as Pepy's commission as an officer in the Admiralty Office.
See George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 6, 6-7 (1936).
103. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 101, at 13.
104. 1 CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 96, at 532; see also BUGBEE, supra
note 101, at 84. Early patents issued by states included a 1779 New Jersey patent granting Henry
Guest, for the term of five years, "the sole Right of making and selling the Blubber by him lately
invented," id. at 85 (quoting ACTS OF THE COUNCIL & GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY 103) (Peter Wilson ed., Trenton, 1784)), and a 1783 Connecticut patent lasting
14 years to Benjamin Hanks for "a Clock, which winds itself up by the effect of Air, and which
will continue to do so without any other Assistance till the Component parts thereof are destroyed
by Friction .... " Id. at 88 (quoting V PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
237 (Charles J. Hoadley & Leonard W. Labaree eds., Hartford, 1894)). Patents were also
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Only two scholars have suggested a reason for the constitutional
phrase "limited times"1 °5 that is beyond the obvious intention of
eventually moving writings and discoveries into the public domain.
One such scholar, William Winslow Crosskey, points out that at the
time of the Constitutional Convention, English law on common-law
copyright in published works was unclear. Perhaps the majority view
was that perpetual common-law rights originally existed, but had been
eliminated by statute. However, the statute's coverage of the American
colonies was undecided. The Framers therefore gave Congress the
power to create rights for "limited times" to effectively destroy any
argument for the continued validity of perpetual common-law
copyright entitlements. Copyright was placed in the same clause as
patent to emphasize the statutory nature of the intended right; English
handled by individual acts during the colonial period. See id. at 57; see, e.g., id. at 60 (in 1641,
granting one "Samu: Winslow" for 10 years the sole right to make salt "by a meanes & way wch
hitherto hath not bene discovered" (quoting I RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR & COMPANY OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 331 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, 1853-54)).
Some credit this as the first patent granted in North America. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 102,
at 12. In 1641, Massachusetts Bay adopted a general policy to grant monopolies only for new
inventions and only for limited periods: "No monopolies shall be granted or allowed amongst us,
but of such new Inventions yet are profitable to ye Country, & yet for a short time." BUGBEE,
supra note 101, at 61 (quoting The Body of Liberties-1641; A Coppie of the Liberties of the
Massachusetts Colonie in New England, reprinted in 34-35 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHU-
SE'TS, REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 1660, WITH THE SUPPLEMENTS TO 1672 (1889).
Connecticut adopted a similar anti-monopoly statute in 1672. Id. at 69 ("It is ordered; That there
shall be no Monopolies granted or allowed among us, but of such new Inventions as shall be
judged profitable for the Country, and that for such time as the General Court shall judge meet."
(quoting THE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT: AN EXACT REPRINT OF THE ORIGINAL EDITION OF
1673 at 52 (1865)). Both these provisions were obviously based on England's Statute of
Monopolies, 21 Jam. I, c. 3 (1624) (Eng.), which attempted to limit the sovereign's power to grant
monopolies. See generally BUGBEE, supra note 101, at 27-43 (overview of early history of English
patent policy); Elizabeth R. Foster, The Procedure of the House of Commons Against Patents and
Monopolies, 1621-1624, in CONFLICT IN STUART ENGLAND 57 (William A. Aiken & Basil D.
Henning eds., 1960) (political history of Statute of Monopolies). While Bugbee points out that
both these colonial anti-monopoly policies were soon violated by granting monopolies to encourage
investment without requiring invention, see BUGBEE, supra note 101, at 61, 70, he reports no
instances of perpetual, exclusive patent grants in the colonial United States. See id. at 57-83.
However, one Massachusetts Bay "patent" for a way of warming rooms with less firewood was,
after an initial three year period, renewed for the life of the inventor. Id. at 64. See also Oscar
Cargill & Patrick A. Moran, Copyright Duration v. The Constitution, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 917
(1971) (arguing that the then pending bill to enlarge the copyright term to the life of the author
plus fifty years is unconstitutional since "life plus fifty" is not a "limited" period of time).
105. 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS & THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 477-508 (1953); John F. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An
Inquiry into the Constitutional Distribution of Powers over the Law of Literary Property in the United
States,-Part 1, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 102 (1961) [hereinafter Whicher, Part I].
See also Cargill & Moran, supra note 104, at 920 (offering a simplified statement of Crosskey's
argument).
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law was settled that monopolies based on invention were creatures of
the government.'0 6  Crosskey considers the Intellectual Property
Clause an especially clear instance of the Constitution's repeated
enumeration of specific powers for the purpose of limiting those
powers.' °7 The second scholar, John F. Whicher, contributes a more
detailed look at the information available in the United States at the
time of the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conven-
tions. While he accepts Crosskey's assertion that the clause primarily
intended to limit the duration of federally creatible rights, he asserts
that this limit was not intended for the states. ' °s
106. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 105, at 477-86. Crosskey's reading of English law seems
inconsistent with Madison's in the FEDERALIST. See infra text accompanying note 100 ("The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at Common Law.
The right to useful inventions seems with equal reasons to belong to the inventors."). But, as
Crosskey points out, the FEDERALIST was written for persuasion, not accuracy. See 1 CROSSKEY,
supra note 105, at 406-07. But see 2 CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 96, at 38
("[T]he writers of the Federalist ... made a commentary on the [Constitution] so comprehensive
and accurate that in after-times their view has been considered to have foreshadowed the doctrines
that have been generally acted upon."). But see generally James W. Ducayet, Publius and
Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 821 (1993) (discussing various reasons for using The Federalist when interpreting the
Constitution and concluding most are unconvincing). Crosskey's argument is somewhat
supported by the Supreme Court's holding that the Constitution's Copyright Clause forecloses
the existence of perpetual common-law copyrights. The Court relied on both the word "secure"
and the acknowledged absence of common-law rights in inventions. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. (8 Peter) 591, 660-61 (1834). But see Ramsey, supra note 102, at 15-19 (arguing that the
term "secure" in the Constitution implies a preexisting "inherent" right); accord Philip H. Nicklin,
Remarks on Literary Property, 4 N.Y. REV. 273, 293-94 (1839) ("The words of the article ...
expressly recognise this species of property as pre-existing, inasmuch as the object they declare
is 'to secure,' and not 'to create,' for authors and inventors, 'the exclusive,' and not 'an exclusive'
enjoyment of their writings and discoveries."). See generally M.E. BRADFORM, ORIGINAL
INTENTIONS 133 (1993) ("But to 'secure' liberties [quoting the U.S. CONST. pmbl.] is to protect
known and preexistent, historic rights."). But see Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2334, 98 Eng.
Rep. 201, 218 (K.B. 1769) ("'Securing for a term' would not import that there was a common-law
right beyond the term: and 'vesting for a term' does not import that there is no common-law
right."). Prager disagrees with Crosskey's view of patent law. Admitting total absence of case
law, but suggesting existence of undetailed administrative practice of routinely granting patents
in inventions, Prager asserts that both common-law copyrights and common-law patents existed
in 18th century England. See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to
1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 711, 740-42 (1944).
107. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 105, at 486-87. But see Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy
Procedures and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 SUP. CT. REV.
25, 30 (arguing that specific clauses may be clarifications of, rather than limits upon general
clauses). Crosskey also argues that the Framers needed to enumerate all powers even arguably
included in British royal prerogatives in order to clearly assign them to either the executive or
legislative branch. Crosskey sees this listing as a clarification of the legislature's power in relation
to the executive's, rather than a clarification of the national government's powers in relation to
the states'. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 105, at 409-67.
108. Whicher, Part I, supra note 105. The historical material regarding limits on the states
is discussed infra Section V.
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My argument is not that Crosskey is necessarily correct in his
reading of the Framers' motives. I merely point to the fact that no
scholar has supplied a good argument against the facial meaning of the
phrase "limited times."
The Supreme Court has never held that the Intellectual Property
Clause requires authors and inventors be granted only time-limited
rights. The Court has, however, recognized this in dicta:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopo-
ly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest ...
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. 109
The Court has also repeatedly stressed the limited nature of the
copyright monopoly. "We have often recognized the monopoly
privileges that Congress has authorized .. .are limited in nature and
must serve the public good.""'  While this quote refers to statutory
limitations, it relies on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service, Inc.,il which clarified the Constitutional nature of the
statutory requirement of originality."12
Similarly, the Court's patent jurisprudence consistently mentions
that "[t]he [patent] clause is both a power and a limitation";1 13 "the
[Patent] Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations
upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent
monopolies of unlimited duration ..1.1.4
The Court's dicta on time limitations reflects its insistence that
the Intellectual Property Clause be interpreted in harmony with the
stated purpose of the clause. "The primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labors of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures authors the
right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely
109. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (emphasis added).
110. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029 (1994) (citing Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
111. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
112. "Originality is a constitutional requirement. The source of Congress' power to enact
copyright laws is article I, § 8, ci. 8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to 'secur[e]
for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."' Id. at 346.
113. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).




upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." ' The ability
to freely appropriate from another's work is "the essence of copyright
and a constitutional requirement." '116 "The monopoly privileges that
Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed
to provide a special private benefit."' 7
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit has decided a case
concerning the constitutional phrase "limited times" in Marx v. United
States."8 This case involved a radio script registered under the 1909
Copyright Act." 9 The 1909 Act expressly allowed the author to
copyright works "not reproduced for sale" if the works were registered
with the federal Copyright Office. The Act expressed the copyright
term as twenty-eight years from "the date of first publication," which
is defined by the Act as the date on which copies were "placed on sale,
sold, or publicly distributed.""12
The Marx radio script had never been sold or distributed publicly;
it had been shared only with possible performers and related radio
functionaries. The alleged infringer argued that the absence of a
copyright term for works neither sold nor distributed rendered
protection of the work unconstitutional.'' The court, invoking the
maxim that "[1]egislative enactments are to be construed, if possible,
in such [a] way as to render them constitutional,"' 22 set a time limit
congruent with the rest of the statute: twenty-eight years from the
date of deposit.'23
Could "limited times" apply only to patent or only to copyright?
I think not. First, the Supreme Court dicta quoted above, while not
determinative, is drawn from both patent and copyright cases. Second,
while Crosskey's historical reconstruction leaves open the possibility
that copyright limits were more important to the Framers than patent
limits, a better explanation may be that the Framers merely thought a
115. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Thomas B. Richards, The
Value of the Copyright Clause in Construction of Copyright Law, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221,
246 (1975) (suggesting the interpretation of copyright statutes to effectuate constitutional purpose
of promoting science and the useful arts). But see Burchfiel, infra note 198 at 518-24 (statements
of purpose in the Constitution do not create limitations).
116. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (internal quotations and citation omitted; discussing ability to
freely appropriate factual material despite labor involved in collecting such material).
117. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
118. 96 F.2d 204 (1938). Marx seems to be the only case to deal with the issue. See
NIMMER, supra note 97, § 1.05[B].
119. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909) (repealed 1978).
120. Id. §§ 12, 24, 26.
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"perpetual rights" claim was more likely to be raised under copyright.
On the opposite side of the argument, while both Madison and
Pinckney's "original" suggestions of copyright included time limits,
Pinckney's "original" suggestion of patent did not.124  The Conven-
tion's finished text, however, seems to place time limits on both.
Certainly, the Intellectual Property Clause has been read in
different ways, but the confusion about the Clause's meaning relates
only to the distribution of "Science" and "the Useful arts." The
legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act describes the clause as
two provisions merged into one. The purpose of the first provision
is to promote the progress of science by securing for limited times
to authors the exclusive rights to their writings, the word "science"
in this connection having the meaning of knowledge in general ....
The other provision is that Congress has the power to promote the
progress of the useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors
the exclusive right to their discoveries.12
The House Report accompanying the 1909 Copyright Act, however,
linked copyright to both "science and the useful arts.''126  Further-
more, the Patent Act of 1793127 speaks of "art or science," as does
the Patent Act of 1836.28
The phrase "limited times" seems firmly linked to both sub-
clauses. In fact, the science/useful arts dispute is viable only because
the Intellectual Property Clause has two choices as to both the category
of knowledge promoted and the category of persons being assisted.
The third double in the clause, "[w]ritings" and "[d]iscoveries," is
clarified by the term "respective," which specifies the relationship of
these alternatives to the immediately preceding word pair. The
124. See supra text accompanying note 97.
125. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d. Sess. 3, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396
(emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 1923. 82d Cong., 2d. Ses. 4 (1952). The "useful arts" in
modem terms are the technological arts. DONALD J. CHISSUM, PATENTS § 1.01 at 1-5 n.9
(1993).
126. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Ses. 6-7 (1909); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50
("The primary objective of copyright is . .. 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."'); Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection
of Software, in UNIV. OF CHICAGO SCHOOL OF LAW WORKING PAPER ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 5-7, copy on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
127. 1 Stat. 318 § 3 (patent application must include description of invention so "as to enable
any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains... to make... [the invention].")
(repealed 1836).
128. 5 Stat. 117, 119 § 6 (patent application must include description of invention so "as to




remainder of the wording in the clause simply lacks alternatives:
"Congress shall have the power... [t]o promote [a & b] by securing
for limited times to [c & d] the exclusive [r]ight to [c & d's] respective
[e & f." 29  Unless the sentence sections lacking alternatives apply
to both alternatives of each category, writing the sentence in parallel
construction makes no stylistic sense.
The final question to consider is the meaning of "limited
times.' 130  If the term is interpreted intuitively, Congress must
protect intellectual property for a set term limit, for example, a period
of seventeen years. Extending the term to an "unrealistically" long
time, for example, 1000 years, might be held unconstitutional as "the
equivalent of perpetual protection. "131 Intuitive interpretations,
however, may merely signal that the term has not yet been challenged;
lack of challenge may merely signal lack of a party with sufficient
motivation to raise that challenge. A classic example of this is
Tushnet's discussion of interpretations of the thirty-five year age
requirement for the President. An interested presidential candidate
could claim that the limit does not mean physical age, but rather the
maturity level of an eighteenth-century thirty-five year-old, or age
including former reincarnations. 1 2
This logic can be applied to "limited times." The intuitive
interpretation for the term is a "set number of years." However, the
Intellectual Property Clause is a bargain between the public on one
side and authors and inventors on the other: exclusive rights for a
short term in return for perpetual free use by the public after that
term. If the term is equal to or greater than the period during which
the res has value (economic or otherwise), has the public received its
quid pro quo? Arguably a seventeen-year patent term or copyright
term of the author's life plus fifty years is much longer than the
economic life of the res in rapidly changing fields such as computer
programming.
The above argument shortens the allowable term. What about a
reading lengthening the term to practical infinity? Effective January 1,
1978, Congress set the copyright term in reference to the life of the
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
130. The Court approached, but did not reach, this issue in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 560 (1973) (states are not bound by Intellectual Property Clause, therefore perpetual
protection against record piracy is not unconstitutional for lack of time limit).
131. NIMMER, supra note 97, § 1.05[A][1] at 1-44.30 n.2.
132. See Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 683, 686-88 (1985).
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author.13  One law review article claims that life-plus terms are
unconstitutional. 134  The issue, seemingly, has never been litigated.
But human lives are, after all, relatively short.
Would it be allowable for Congress to set the patent term in
relation to the economic life of each individual patent? Would this
change if the economic life of a particular patent seemed much longer
than several human lives, perhaps longer than the above mentioned
1000 years? A patent may retain value long after the particular
invention claimed ceases to be valuable when used independently.
Patent involves the right to exclude others from using, manufacturing,
or selling, etc. the invention.'35 Often basic inventions are valuable
because they are necessary for incorporation into more advanced
technology. Consider an invention like the wheel and axle defined in
broad terms: 3 6  a round, physical object able to be placed on a
support running through its center, the support not blocking the
wheel's movement. Dependent claims could cover, for example, (1)
using the wheel so that it may intersect with other wheels, other
moving parts, and other non-moving items, (2) wheels with smooth
outer surfaces, and (3) wheels with tooth-edged outer surfaces. As a
break-through invention, the wheel would be allowed broad, exclusive
133. This means that different works receive different periods of protection. The Intellectual
Property Clause, however, unlike the Bankruptcy Clause, does not require "uniform laws."
Copyright Act of 1976, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 ("IN GENERAL.-Copyright in a work
created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the
following subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after
the author's death.") (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988)).
134. See Oscar Cargill & Patrick A. Moran, Copyright Duration v. The Constitution, 17
WAYNE L. REV. 917, 927-29 (1971) (arguing that life plus fifty years is not a "limited time").
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) ("Every patent shall contain.., a grant to the patentee...
of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention .... ); see also 35
U.S.C. § 271 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (definition of infringement).
136. Cf. Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911). After
long litigation, the court in Duerr limited the reach of a patent claiming
[t]he combination with a road locomotive, provided with suitable running gear including
a propelling wheel and steering mechanism, of a liquid hydo-carbon gas engine of the
compression type, comprising one or more power cylinders, a suitable liquid-fuel
receptacle, a power shaft connected with and arranged to run faster than the propelling
wheel, an intermediate dutch or disconnecting device, and a suitable carriage body
adapted to the conveyance of persons or goods ....
Id. at 896. This patent, filed for in 1879 and issued in 1895, id. at 894, was originally read as
"cover[ing] every modem car driven in any way by petroleum vapor and as yet commercially
successful." Id. (quoting court below, no citation supplied); see generally WILLIAM GREENLEAF,
MONOPOLY ON WHEELS: HENRY FORD AND THE SELDEN AUTOMOBILE PATENT (1961)
(popularly written history of the patent litigation).
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power.137 A corporation which owned such a patent could survive
indefinitely on the license fees from, for example, any motor with a
gear or any object that moved with wheels on a track or flat surface.
Could Congress then set the patent term as the period during which
the invention increases in usefulness or economic worth? If so, then
the holder of the patent on the wheel could claim that this period had
not ended until an alternative technology existed and had started taking
over a large share of the wheel market. While this is arguably
constitutional, I doubt it would convince a court any more than
Tushnet's reincarnated guru. 3
What about tying the life of a patent or copyright to the life of a
trademark? For the subset of writings and discoveries that are used as
trademarks, Congress could stipulate that the patent/copyright grant
be a certain percentage of the life of the mark. This would present
several problems. First, trademarks usually die only when they are
abandoned.139 Even when going out of business, the holder of a
mark may sell it to any other firm if the holder also sells certain other
firm assets. 4° The "limited time" would therefore last as long as the
mark-holder wished. Second, if Congress set the "limited time" at
some percentage of the mark's life, the period would not be calculable
until after the mark died, thus rendering such a term practically
impossible. Third, tying the life of a patent or copyright to the life of
a trademark may be one of the few Congressional decisions that would
not pass a judicial rationality test-unless by-passing a limit in the text
of the Constitution is an acceptable governmental purpose. Finally,
allowing a patent or copyright term for the full life of a mark does not
advance the progress of science and the useful arts because it does not
result in an enlargement of the public domain.
137. See, e.g., Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 415
(1908) ("It is well settled that a greater degree of liberality and a wider range of equivalents are
permitted where the patent is of a pioneer character than when the invention is simply an
improvement .. ") (citation and internal quotations omitted); Westinghouse v. Boyden Power
Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561 (1898) ("To what liberality of construction these claims are entitled
depends to a certain extent upon the character of the invention, and whether it is what is termed
in ordinary parlance a 'pioneer."'); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
805 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (the "proposition is long established" that a "basic patent
on a pioneering invention is entitled to be interpreted broadly.").
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988). Trademarks also die when they become generic, id., but
genericide is already grounds for cancellation of an incontestable mark. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3),
1065(4).
140. Congress could end patent/copyright when the mark is sold-however, a lawyer could
simply restructure the sale to be a sale of the business entity holding the mark.
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One could make the plain language argument that the plural
"times" allows multiple time periods-with "limited" constricting each
separate "time" but not the number of such limited-length time periods.
The original manuscript of the Constitution shows the clause was first
written to allow "a limited time," but was later changed to read
"limited times. ' 41 The suggestion that the plural "times" allows
infinite grants of consecutive "limited" periods is conceivable, but
strained. The Framers could have rationally chosen to bar a grant of
unlimited time periods, while allowing numerous successive grants of
limited time periods, when such grants are warranted by various
conditions. But the Framers generally avoided that level of detail,
leaving it for future legislation. Furthermore, this reading would not
save the incontestability provision which gives unlimited temporal
protection in one grant.
Other readings are possible. For instance, the change to "limited
times" may have been intended to allow renewal terms.'42 The
change could also have been stylistic polishing for parallelism (the right
is being allowed to two different sets of recipients: authors and inven-
tors). But the modem notion of parallelism suggests that "right"
should have been "rights." Perhaps the best reading is that the change
was made to clarify that the limited time granted inventors does not
have to be of the same length as the limited time allowed authors.'43
However, all these suggestions are guesses unbacked by historical
evidence.'44
Has the clause evolved into a new meaning? I do, emphatically,
believe in an "evolving Constitution, ''14 but such evolution does not
undercut the importance of temporal limits. The Court continues to
141. Ramsey, supra note 102, at 14.
142. This is Ramsey's interpretation, for which he cites no authority. See Ramsey, supra
note 102, at 14.
143. Congress has granted rights of varying lengths, and there has been no argument that
this is unconstitutional. In terms of required economic incentives and social costs, the distinction
seems eminently reasonable. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. USA
109, 114 (1991) ("[lIt is important to separate the price consequences of the copyright property
from the price consequences of the patent property .... Patent protection may well confer
market share and effectively result in monopoly pricing .... [But] one author's expression will
always be substitutable for another's."). But see Prager, supra note 106, at 740 (longer terms for
copyrights are "merely a result of differential bargaining powers ... in the fight for intellectual
property protection. Inherently, there was and is no justification for copyright terms being any
longer than patent terms... "; no- support offered).
144. Except for renewal terms, see Ramsey, supra note 102, at 14, these guesses are the
author's own suggestions.
145. See generally Ruth B. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1186-88 (1992) (long historical pedigree of evolutionary view of the Constitution) ("Those
commitments [of the founders] had growth potential.").
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view eventual dedication of works to the public domain as the core
purpose of the clause. Perhaps under a rigorous economic analysis the
current statutorily-set time limits are too long.146 To make this
decision we might need to quantify non-quantifiable public domain
interests possessed by readers and gadget-users, not merely by later
writers and inventors. Certainly we would need to integrate numerical
representations of the current market into the economists' theoretical
models' 47-something neither congressional committees nor courts
seem to do.'48
The constitutional phrase "limited times" should be interpreted
to mean that Congress' exclusive grants to authors and inventors must
be temporally finite. 49
146. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (classic article written
during consideration of the 1976 Copyright Act, arguing against, among other things, extension
of copyright term for books); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987) (opposing protection for main frame operating systems, id. at
1363-64; supporting sui generis protection similar to patent for other operating systems but with
shorter terms and compulsory licensing, id. at 1364-66; supporting sui generis protection similar
to copyright for applications programs but with shorter terms and compulsory licenses, id. at
1371); Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of
the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 514 n.214 (1985) ("[Clomputer
programs in machine-readable form do not belong in copyright... because of the generally short
commercial life of software, a shorter term than copyright provides would seem appropriate";
World Intellectual Property Organization suggests only 20 years). But see WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 86 (1969) ("determination of the optimal [patent] life is extremely
difficult but not necessarily very important."); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 (2) J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 363 (1989) ("The present
[copyright] term may seem both too long... and arbitrary .... But maybe the term is neither
....1 ).
147. See, e.g., Paul Kemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21
RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990) (arguing that length and breadth interact in creating optimal level of
patent protection); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 106 (1990) (different nuance of Kemperer's argument).
148. The generally unsatisfactory nature of the congressional hearings on the
Copyright Revision Bill underlines the importance of these conclusions [not to extend
protection by time or scope]. The hearings reveal little critical analysis of industry
claims that protection is needed. They show little awareness of the possible harms of
extending protection. Rather, the data amassed at the hearings is unsifted, often
irrelevant, fact and opinion, and many critical facts about affected industries are missing.
Breyer, supra note 146, at 351. Post-eighteenth century understandings of collective action
problems, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), and the growing
centrality of advertising in our metaphors, see, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-77 (1993); Pollack, supra note 36, at 1412-19, counsel less private
control of writings and inventions.
149. See also L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Need
for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385, 396-97 (1992)
(asserting, without analysis, that "[t]he terms 'authors,' 'writings,' and 'limited times' are
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C. Intellectual Property Clause Limits on the Commerce Clause5 °
Two limited classes of incontestable marks violate the Intellectual
Property Clause by creating immortal rights. While courts have
alluded to possible reinforcement of the Intellectual Property Clause
with the Commerce Clause, no court has suggested that Congress may
by pass the "limited times" provision."' Similarly, although Con-
gress has passed intellectual property statutes by relying on the
Commerce Clause, none of these statutes attempts to by pass the
"limited times" provision. Additionally, commentators have discussed
the intersection of the Commerce Clause with the Intellectual Property
sufficiently clear.").
150. Nimmer raises the possibility of First Amendment limits on the Intellectual Property
Clause, both on its own and combined with the Commerce Clause. See NIMMER, supra note 97,
§ 1.10(A); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?: Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 384-87 (1992) (First
Amendment implications of a statute protecting Compiled Information). I leave this fascinating
problem for a later date, partially due to its complexity, but mainly to the low probability of its
relevance to any trademark covered by this Article (at least under current doctrinal limits on
copyrightable subject matter and issues of First Amendment concern). Despite commentators'
theories about possible conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, the Court has not
recognized a problem. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
151. The absence of certain clauses from the Constitution is important when construing the
extent to which Congress' power is limited by the Constitution. Cf Swint v. Chambers County
Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1210 a n.4 (1995) (relying on Congress' choice not to adopt a
suggestion to illuminate meaning of statute as enacted). During the ratification debate, several
persons called for an express provision barring congressional creation of any commercial
monopoly. See Letter of Thursday, January 14, 1788, in I BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 510, 512 (1971) ("By sect. 8 of article I, Congress are
[sic] to have the unlimited right to regulate commerce, external and internal, and may therefore
create monopolies which have been universally injurious to all the subjects of the countries that
have adopted them, except the monopolists themselves."); George Mason's Objections to the
Proposed Federal Constitution, in SCHWARTZ, supra, at 444, 446 ("By requiring only a majority
to make all commercial and navigation laws, the five southern states... will be ruined: . . . [this]
will enable the merchants of the northern and eastern states... to monopolize the purchase of
commodities .... "; "[u]nder their own construction of the general clause at the end of the
enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce .... "). Several
commentators have taken these suggestions, even though unadopted, added the alleged dear
ability of Congress to issue patents under the Commerce Clause, and concluded that Congress
has no power to issue patents to stimulate commerce. "[I]t necessarily follows that a separate
patent clause was included at least in part to emphasize that Congress had no power to provide
for the granting of patents primarily as a stimulant to commerce." Mary Helen Sears & Edward
S. Irons, The Constitutional Standard of Invention-The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH
L. REV. 653, 675-76. Sears and Irons conclude that the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments combine to create a current limit on congressional power to limit people's choices
of livelihood through either the Intellectual Property or Commerce Clauses. See id. at 677-78;
see also infra note 236 (discussing SCM's reliance on this argument in Kewanee Oil). I am totally
skeptical of silence creating such strong limits on Congress.
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Clause, but none has suggested a theory that allows Congress to by-
pass the "limited times" provision.
1. Equivalent Rights-A Thesis
If the Copyright Clause does not limit the Commerce Clause by
negative implication, Congress may do as it wishes. However, the
Court's quick destruction of nonuniform laws of bankruptcy in Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons"2 suggests otherwise. In Railway
Labor, the central question was how to separate rules of bankruptcy
from closely related rules of commerce."5 3 Applying this to the
question at hand, it follows that the constitutionality of trademark
incontestability turns on how to separate one aspect of commerce
(trademarks) from both patents and copyrights."5 4
The linking of Copyright Clause protection to a minimal creative
spark in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service5' fired a
controversy over whether a misappropriation-type statute under the
Commerce Clause could protect "sweat of the brow" works such as
data bases.5 6 The expected constitutional question in a Data Base
1.52. 455 U.S. 457 (1982). The absence of certain clauses from the Constitution is important
when construing the extent to which Congress' power is limited by the Constitution as ratified.
See id. at 468-69.
153. See id. at 465-66.
154. If such marks are unconstitutional, we do not have to reach the issues of the meaning
of the Lanham Act or the intent of Congress because the statute contains a clear severability
clause. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988) (note) ("If any provision of this Act or the application of
such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not
be affected thereby.").
155. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
156. The leading article centering on the issue is Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?: Copyright
and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
338 (1992). Other relevant articles include: David 0. Carson, Copyright Protection for Factual
Compilations After Feist: A Practitioner's Views, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 969, 992-94 (1992)
(assuming without discussion that, "Congress could enact noncopyright legislation under the
Commerce Clause to prevent misappropriation of works that are not entitled to copyright," but
arguing that no action should be taken until later decisions clarify affect of Feist); Michael B.
Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated Originality as a Prerequisite for
Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1468 n.42, 1471-73, 1474 (1992) (arguing
that Railway Labor shows only that Commerce Clause is limited by "explicit or affirmative
limitations" in other clauses--originality is not explicit in the Copyright Clause; that the Lanham
Act and the Court's decisions on the spending and taxing power show Congress has the power
to protect "sweat of the brow" items under its choice of the Commerce Clause or the Copyright
Clause; and that Feist's invocation of a constitutional need for originality is dicta in relation to all
works except compilations); Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. USA 109, 119
(reading Feist's reference to the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), as the Court's suggestion
for protection of data bases under the Commerce Clause); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and
Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885 (1992) (limits of copyright protection for works
should look at social harm of piracy, i.e. misappropriation, and, therefore look to the creativity,
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Protection Act litigation is, therefore, how to separate copyright from
commerce."5 7 Similarly, the strength of the objections to intellectual
property statutes recently passed by Congress in full or partial reliance
on the Commerce Clause'58 turns on how to separate patent and
copyright from commerce.
First, I must clarify why the above paragraph, following other
authors' terms,'59 is seriously incorrect and thus leads to misanalysis.
When discussing the limits placed on Congress by the Constitution,
we are construing the Constitution-not related areas of common or
statutory law.'6°
The Intellectual Property Clause, containing the Copyright and
Patent Clauses, mentions neither the word "patent" nor the word
"copyright." It allows Congress to grant "exclusive rights" in
"writings" and "discoveries" to their "authors" and "inventors" in
order to "promote science and the useful arts." At the time the
Constitution was written, England had legal rights, well known to the
Framers, called patents and copyrights. The only logical conclusion
from the Framers' choice not to use these words is that they did not
want to tie the Clause to the technical meaning of "patent" and
"copyright."'' The non-use of "patent" and "copyright" by the
skill, and effort involved in the work's fixation) (Feist should be read narrowly); Philip H. Miller,
Note, Life After Feist: The First Amendment and the Copyright Status of Automated Databases, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 526, 536-38 & nn. 180-95 (1991) (suggesting, without real analysis of
limits on the Commerce Clause, that Congress use it as authority to protect automated data
bases); Patterson, supra note 149, at 407-10 (arguing that protection of low-authorship works
under copyright is an historically-driven error and recommending a trade regulation statute under
the Commerce Clause be substituted; reading Feist's subject as the Copyright Act, not the
Copyright Clause); Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331,
332 (1992) ("To the extent that Feist results in lesser copyright protection for compilations of data
.... [i]t is likely that there will be active consideration given to state and federal legislation
establishing some version of misappropriation principles for the protection of data bases"; no
discussion of constitutional limits of such legislation).
157. See, e.g., Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?, supra note 150, at 371.
158. See infra Section IV.C.3.
159. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the
Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389, 406-29 (1992) (discussing what a patent right is and why
the Orphan Drug Act unconstitutionally creates a patent right).
160. This, of course, does not mean such related matters may not be considered.
161. Accord Fenning, supra note 95, at 445 (Constitution does not use the words: "possibly
lest the power be limited to the particular forms . .. at that time known as copyrights and
patents."); Tom Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded by Patent, Trademark, Copyright
and Unfair Competition Law: The Sources and Nature of Product Simulation Law, 54 TRADEMARK
REP. 413, 418 (1964) (pre-Constitution, states often required that an invention be put to public
use or a book be printed in sufficient supply at a fair price to maintain patent or copyright;
Constitution probably left out words "patent" and "copyright" to prevent implication these were
required); cf. Benjamin Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright: The Capitol Record Case, 69
HARV. L. REV. 409, 423 (1956) ("Yet even in 1787 lawyers were familiar with the importance
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Framers means that similarity to statutory copyrights and patents is
not the test for the constitutionality of Commerce Clause-based rights
in intellectual property. Instead, suspect provisions must be compared
to "exclusive rights" over "writings and discoveries" given to "authors
and inventors" for "limited times" in order to "promote the progress
of science and the useful arts." '162
For simplicity, I will call the prerogatives that the Constitution
allows Congress to create (as opposed to the actual ones Congress has
created through statute) "authors' exclusive rights," (AER's) and
"inventors' exclusive rights," (IER's).
Something very like an AER or IER with one element missing is,
most probably, not allowable, much as a nonuniform law having the
other attributes of a bankruptcy law is not allowable. The more
difficult question is whether Congress may protect something where
one, some, or all of the elements are slightly below the minimum set
by constitutional description. Determining likeness will involve a
separation of the limits imposed by the Clause from the description of
the res involved in the Clause. Do we look at exclusive rights in
writings and discoveries to insure that each (a) promotes science and
the useful arts, (b) is given to authors and inventors, and (c) is for
limited times? Or, in the alternative, do we look at actions intended
to promote science and the useful arts to make sure that they are (a)
exclusive, (b) granted only for writings and discoveries, and (c) are
granted only to authors or inventors? Is the identity of the relevant
definitional term context dependent?' 63
of publication in copyright law, and the failure to use the term [publication] in the copyright
clause may indicate that no distinction was intended for constitutional purposes between published
and unpublished works."). In the case of patent, failure to use the word "patent" may be a choice
not to bar other forms of government grants including monopolies. But see Flynn, supra note 159,
at 414 n.81 ("Although unnecessary to the analysis of... this Article, it is submitted that from
an historical point of view, ... the Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause should be read
together as establishing an implicit policy of precluding the federal government from granting
private parties unregulated and exclusive monopolies over economic activity other than that
authorized by the Patent Clause."). Flynn incorrectly ignores the Framers' choice not to pattern
the Intellectual Property Clause after the existing British Statute of Monopolies. See supra note
104 (discussing British Statute of Monopolies).
162. But see Patterson, supra note 149, at 397 (asserting that the Copyright Clause and the
Statute of Anne, the English Copyright Act, have the same basic content expressed in different
language; and, also, that the word changes were made only to allow one constitutional clause to
cover inventions and writings).
163. To clarify my interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause and illustrate the power
of the AER-IER/copyright-patent distinction, consider the post-Feist controversy on the
constitutionality of a federal data base misappropriation act. I agree with Jane Ginsburg's
conclusion that a statute under the Commerce Clause would be constitutional if "the protective
law departs in significant ways from the copyright model," provided it also allowed the free-riding
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Courts make a standard distinction between trademarks and
AERs. Federal trademark law protects "distinctive words, [product
shapes,] and symbols against copying, but only to the extent that the
copying or imitation is likely to cause confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of the goods or services, or constitutes a false representa-
tion.""' Objects protected as AERs "may be deserving of copyright
.... Their entitlement to trademark recognition, however, depends not
on their eye appeal but on their characteristic of identifying the
manufacturer."' 65 The purpose behind the protection of a trademark
is to prevent fraud, not to promote science and the useful arts.
Trademark protection is clearly allowable, especially as trademark
requires neither an author nor a res with a minimum spark of originality.66
on "sweat works" labeled a constitutional policy in Feist. See Ginsburg, No "Sweat," supra note
150, at 370-74. 1 disagree only by clarifying that the differences must be judged against the
constitutional mandate of the Intellectual Property Clause, AERs, not the Copyright Statute
Congress chose to enact. I, therefore, consider unproblematical that such a statute would be
triggered by copying; this is a statutory concern relevant only to preemption under 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). But see Ginsburg, No "Sweat, " supra note 149, at 373. Unlike
Ginsburg, I suggest that the creation of a non-exclusive right in "sweat works" is probably
sufficient change to allow Commerce Clause foundation. The industrious collector who compiles
the material for a data base may constitutionally be given a federal statutory right to charge his
cost plus reasonable profit (but not his desired profit) for its use, cf. Pankaj Tandon, Optimal
Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. POL. ECON. 470 (1982) (economic argument that the use
of compulsory licensors in patent system would improve social welfare), provided he is required
to sell to all requesters, i.e. a right subject to a compulsory license. This is Jane Ginsburg's
suggestion in her pre-Feist article. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 1865, 1924-27 (1990). The price limit
is my own modest addition intended to survive the free-riding principle announced in Feist. Feist,
499 U.S. at 349 ("It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used
by others without compensation .... [But it is... the essence of copyright and a constitutional
requirement.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). I hope "without compensation" may
be modified as slightly over-emphatic dicta.
164. Ginsburg, No "Sweat," supra note 149, at 371.
165. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1240
(6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fibreglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689,
692-93 (N.D. Ga. 1977)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
166. Accord MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6.04[2], at 6-26 ("[E]xpiration of the copyright
does not bar a claim for trademark or trade dress. Whether or not a feature claimed as trademark
or trade dress is also copyrightable is irrelevant.") (footnotes citing cases omitted); cf. In re
Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (design patent available on copyrighted res). This
analysis replaced a simplistic view that trademark use of a formerly patented design was an illicit
attempt to stretch the patent monopoly. For a history of the change, see Douglas R. Wolf, The
Doctrine of Elections: Has the Need to Choose Been Lost?, 9 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 439,
441-58 (1991). The Copyright Office, oddly, refuses to issue copyright registration "in a patented
design or in the drawings or photographs in a patent application... after the patent has been
issued," even though "[tihe potential availability of protection under the design patent law will
not affect ... registrabiity." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1993). Similarly, "[a] claim to copyright in
a scientific or technical drawing [may be registered even if it is] part of a pending patent
application." But copyright registration will be denied "[wihere the patent has been issued." Id.
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Trademarks that are not functional have a similar relationship to
IERs. Trademarks do not have the non-obviousness of "discoveries";
they are not originated by "inventors." Furthermore, the companies
using the trademarks may not have created them; therefore, no rights
are given to "inventors." Their purpose is to prevent fraud in the
market place, not to advance science and the useful arts. While
trademarks do grant exclusive rights, their immortality does not violate
the Patent Clause.
Now consider the distinct case of an incontestable, functional
trademark. As discussed above, 67 the judicially created functionality
doctrine bars protection of a useful element as a trademark because
courts consider such protection an illegitimate attempt to by-pass the
"limited time" and high creativity requirements of patent. Comparing
a trademark which is functional to an IER, we have two different
possibilities: (1) the mark is below the non-obviousness and novelty
standards of patent creativity; or (2) the mark reaches the standard of
patent creativity.
In the first case, the mark (a) hurts the progress of science and the
useful arts by preventing sharing of a minor building block for other
changes, (b) has an originator who is not quite an inventor, but the
originator may not be related to the commercial entity using the mark,
(c) protects a useful item, for example, one alike to but not quite
creative enough to be an invention, (d) provides an exclusive right, and
(e) exists for a potentially unlimited time. While debatable, this
protection seems too close to the rights allowed by the Intellectual
Property Clause to be constitutional. 16
An even stronger case can be made against an incontestable,
functional mark that reaches the standard of patent creativity. This
mark (a) hurts the progress of science and the useful arts by giving a
permanent monopoly, (b) has an inventor (though the mark may not
belong to him), (c) is a discovery, (d) grants exclusive rights, and (e)
provides rights that are potentially immortal. This is clearly unconsti-
tutional.
§ 202.10(b). A trademark on a print or label will not bar copyright registration. Id. § 202.10(c);
see also Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1391 (C.D. Cal.
1993) (trademarked label may be copyrighted). No court has ruled on the validity of these
regulations barring registration. See Wolf, supra, at 469 & n.196 (relying on letter from
Copyright Office). The Copyright Office claims policy and case law reasons for the rule, not
constitutional ones. See id. at 463-470.
167. See supra Section III.B., Functionality.
168. It also seems to be a bad policy choice. However, Congress may constitutionally make
bad, but not irrational, policy choices.
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Incontestability is unconstitutional to the extent it protects
functional trademarks. Therefore, functionality must be an available
defense to an incontestable mark; functionality must be sufficient cause
to cancel the registration of an incontestable mark.'69 The PTO's
policy of refusing to register functional features as trademarks does not
negate this conclusion. 7  After all, the PTO can make mistakes. 71
The patent-based restriction on functional marks is parallel to the
copyright-based restriction on merely descriptive marks. 72
A 'merely descriptive' mark ... describes the qualities or character-
istics of a good or service .... this type of mark may be registered
only if the registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning,
i.e., it "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in com-
merce."1
73
In infringement cases involving non-incontestable marks, the defendant
wins if he shows that the mark is merely descriptive and has not
acquired secondary meaning. 74  The Supreme Court, however,
construes the Lanham Act to bar mere descriptiveness as a defense to
infringement of an incontestable mark.171 In cases involving incon-
testable marks, the subject of secondary meaning is never litigated even
if the mark is merely descriptive. This largely reduces the test for
trademark infringement of incontestable marks to similarity between
169. If functional, incontestable marks were unenforceable in court but left on the primary
register; they would not give companies exclusive rights to use. But such marks would give
companies exclusive rights to register. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(aXl)(A), (b)(1XA) (1988). Registration
itself is valuable. See Park N' Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 219 n.28
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. TMEP, supra note 40, § 1202.03.
171. If the PTO mistakenly registered the mark or mistakenly acknowledged the mark as
incontestable because of the registrant's fraud, the fraud would be a distinct defense to alleged
infringement of an incontestable mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(1) (1988). But not all PTO
errors require fraud. For example, neither the opinion of the district court nor of the court of
appeals in Shakespeare discusses possible fraud on the PTO. But see Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 5, Silstar Corp. v. Shakespeare, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994) (No. 93-1568) (implying
some type of misconduct in Statement of the Case, though not arguing fraud in the petition)
("Failing to disclose to the Trademark and Patent Office that the clear tip was the natural
appearance produced by its manufacturing process, Shakespeare was allowed to register as a
trademark such clear tip portion of a fishing rod.").
172. This Article assumes that IER's should be conceptualized as akin to utility patents.
Design patents protect non-useful design features which reach the patent level of creativity. 35
U.S.C. § 171 (1988). Such a design seems incapable of being merely descriptive in trademark
terminology. If such a patented design did exist, it would share the constitutional problem of a
merely descriptive, copyrightable trademark.
173. Park N' Fly, 469 U.S. at 194 (quoting U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), (f)).
174. See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 15.01[2], at 15-5.
175. Park N' Fly, 469 U.S. at 205.
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the junior and the senior users' marks. Fraud in the marketplace,
however, is only possible if the mark is tied in the consumer's mind to
both the junior and the senior user: "[S]imilarity, even identity, is not
enough if [the senior user] ha[s] no interest in the words and the
graphic that entitled him [or her] to restrict their use." '176 Thus, if
an incontestable mark is copyrightable subject matter. 7 and merely
descriptive, the trademark holder has exclusive, temporally unlimited
rights, even though the mark does not serve the purpose of preventing
confusion and fraud in the market place. This is unconstitutional.
The possible rarity of such trademarks does not change the
analysis. Names, single words, and slogans are not copyrightable,178
but the problem could presumably arise with merely descriptive
picture-marks or product configurations.
This AER argument suggests a possible flaw in my IER
argument. Why is a functional, incontestable trademark unacceptable
without the additional flaw of mere descriptiveness? If the functional
mark serves the non-patent purpose of preventing fraud in the
marketplace, why isn't this enough to insulate it from the Patent
Clause? The distinction would be easier to make if this were a
statutory179 or policy argument-the monopoly dangers are much
greater for functional features. However, the policy argument is
embedded in the constitutional clause: "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts." Even though a functional trademark may
176. Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cit. 1990), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 814 (1991).
177. Presumably this will be something other than a word mark since single words, phrases,
and slogans are not currently considered copyrightable. See, e.g., The Trade-mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (commonly, trademarks consist of material lacking the originality required
for either copyright or patent); Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1913, 1918 (4th Cir. 1993)
("[Tlhe disputed phrase [You got the right one, uh-huh] fails to evince the requisite degree of
originality to entitle it to copyright protection and is a short expression of the sort that courts have
uniformly held uncopyrightable."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2742 (1994); see generally MCCARTHY,
supra note 22, § 6.05[1][b] (copyrightability of short word marks) (3rd ed. 1992). But see Tin Pan
Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1791 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying summary
judgment) ("A jury could find that the Hugga-Hugga and Brr sounds, used as lyrics, are
sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection.").
178. 37 C.F.R. § 202.01(a); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM
II: COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICE § 202.2(i) (1984) [hereinafter COMPENDI-
UM II]. As with most legal generalities, some exceptions exist. See generally, MCCARTHY, supra
note 22, § 6.05[1][b] (copyrightability of short phrases).
179. The PTO defines de jure functional marks to not function as marks. It does so without
regard to whether consumers recognize the functional feature as an indication of source. See
TMEP, supra note 40, § 1202.03(aXiXC) ("A showing of acquired distinctiveness is irrelevant
with regard to a design that is de jure functional," citing In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d
496, 503 (C.C.P.A. 1961)).
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prevent fraud in the market place, other fraud-prevention means must
be sought because the price of this one is too high. Creating an
immortal, exclusive right in an invention (or functional feature which
is not creative enough to be an invention) retards the progress of the
useful arts. Writings, however, like copyrighted res, seem to include
only expressions, not ideas. 80 The constitutional problem is acute
enough to warrant a reading of the Lanham Act that avoids the
problem.181
This thesis also fails if trademarks do not grant exclusive
rights.18 2  However, trademark does seem to provide exclusivity for
the limited items it covers. Trademarks are not public goods like the
"writings" and "discoveries" targeted by copyrights and patents;
trademarks perform their function of cutting consumer search costs for
desired products only if each mark is used by only one seller per
market.183 Trademark protects elements that are visible to actors in
the marketplace'84 and does not apply to patentable hidden uses,
such as processes, or product aspects invisible to a user.8 ' As to the
items it covers, trademark grants an exclusive right, barring all uses
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."186
180. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
181. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see also Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1743 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(invoking Ashwander principle).
182. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 149, at 398 (arguing that the exclusive right the
Copyright Clause permits Congress to grant to author is "only the right to publish their writings
[in print media]"; suggesting no definition of "exclusive rights" as applied to inventors); see also
id. at 401-03 (arguing that the Copyright Clause gave Congress the power to grant only the
limited rights covered by the Statute of Anne (the exclusive right to publish copies for a limited
time period starting at first publication), but not the perpetual common law right of first
publication).
183. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 269-70.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (trademark defined as something "use[d] in
commerce .. to identify and distinguish his or her goods.., from those manufactured or sold
by others").
185. Cf. Badger Meter Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1507, 1514 (7th Cir. 1994)
("[T]he total image [trade dress] of the Badger Recordall [water] meter [may include] the internal
appearance of its measuring chamber because Badger introduced evidence that buyers examine
water meters inside and out.").
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Many courts are enlarging this by
considering likely confusion by third parties who merely see a purchaser's use of the trademarked




Despite some interesting dicta, no court has analyzed the power
of the Commerce Clause to cover limitations in the Intellectual
Property Clause. Neither has a court suggested that the Commerce
Clause allows immortal rights equivalent to AERs or IERs.'87
Judge Learned Hand, after holding a patent invalid, offered a
general discourse on the merits of the patent system. He speculated
that if a statute grants patents to investors, as opposed to inventors,
and is outside the Patent Clause, "perhaps it could, like the trademark
statute, be based on the interstate commerce clause."'88 A later panel
of the Second Circuit decided not to consider whether "Congress could
grant monopolies for non-useful and non-original material if Congress
based its authority to do so on the constitutional interstate commerce
power" because "Congress ha[d] not so acted."' 89 After finding that
federal copyright law preempted state law, the California Supreme
Court asserted, "[i]t is clear ... that Congress has the power to protect
literary titles under either the Copyright or Commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution and has simply elected not to do so."' 90
One circuit held that the Commerce Clause is sufficient authority
for part of the Copyright Act. That case, however, is not helpful.
Until July 1, 1986, the "manufacturing clause" of the Copyright Act
barred importation of certain types of otherwise copyrightable English-
language works unless the works were printed in the United States or
187. Looking at the mirror issue, "[b]y virtue of the explicit constitutional grant [the
Copyright Clause], Congress has the unquestioned authority to penalize directly the distribution
of goods that infringe copyright, whether or not those goods affect interstate commerce."
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 220 (1985) (holding in dicta that the National Stolen
Property Act does not cover interstate transportation of phonorecords "stolen, converted or taken
by fraud," 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), only in the sense that they were made
without the copyright holder's authorization).
188. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 n.22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
651 (1942). Since patents are readily assignable, this limitation is hardly onerous. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 118 (1988) ("Whenever an inventor refuses to execute an application for patent, or cannot be
found ... , a person to whom the inventor has assigned or agreed in writing to assign the
invention or who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter ... may make
application for patent on behalf of and as agent for the inventor .... "). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1988) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer ... is considered the author for the
purposes of this title... "). But cf Monore Price & Malla Pollack, The Author in Copyright,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 703, 710 n.27 (1992) (raising issue of animal or computer
authors). Furthermore, even when the inventor signs the application, he may have already
assigned the rights. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (microbiologist
filed a patent application for rights assigned to the General Electric Co.).
189. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 n.2 (2d Cir. 1945).
190. Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121 (1971).
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Canada.' 9' A writers' association sued for a declaratory judgment
that the clause was unconstitutional because protection of the domestic
printing industry is only tenuously related to the stated purposes of the
Copyright Clause.1 2  The court did not reach the breadth of the
Copyright Clause, but rather, held that the Commerce Clause gave
Congress power to restrict imports in order to foster the growth of a
domestic industry.'93 This conclusion rests on one core purpose of
the Commerce Clause; it does not attempt to use the Commerce
Clause to by pass limits on AERs and IERs.
3. Congress' Actions
The idea of using the Commerce Clause to expand Congressional
power over intellectual property is not new. The Court alludes to this
power as early as the Trade-Mark Cases'94 in 1879. Congress
eventually followed the Court's suggestion by linking the Lanham Act,
the federal trademark statute, to "all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress."'5
Perhaps in an excess of caution, Congress has rested several pieces
of intellectual property legislation, at least in part, on the Commerce
Clause.' 96 None of these, however, suggest Congress believes that
191. 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (sunset date of July 1, 1986) (enacted July 13, 1982, Pub. L. 97-215,
96 Stat. 178).
192. Authors League of America, Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 224 (1986) (other
constitutional arguments were also raised and rejected).
193. Id.
194. 100 U.S. 82, 93-94, 98-99 (1879) (holding that Congress cannot regulate trademarks
under the Intellectual Property Clause since they are not "the fruits of intellectual labor," and
holding that Congress may be able to regulate trade-marks under the Commerce Clause but must
limit statute to exclude marks used only in commerce between citizens of the same state).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (defining "commerce"). As stated
previously, trademarks are potentially immortal-however, the Trade-Mark Cases held that
trademarks are not covered by the Intellectual Property Clause.
196. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 901-914 (1988)); Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1988)); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 387 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. Titles 21
& 35); Orphan Drug Amendments [Act] of 1985, Pub. L. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985) (amending
21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 306 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term
Restoration Act, Pub. L. 100-670 102 Stat. 3971 (1988); Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984, Pub. L. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified at Chapter 9 of U.S.C. Title 17).
Congress also relied on multiple constitutional authorities when eliminating the states'
sovereign immunity to infringement of various types of intellectual property. This seems fueled
by Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlan, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (requiring super-plain-meaning in
such pronouncements), rather than an attempt to by pass the Intellectual Property Clause. The
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (which dealt with
remedies for both dassic copyright infringement and infringement of mask works), mentioned the
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by legislating under the Commerce Clause, it can by pass the "limited
[t]imes" provision of the Intellectual Property Clause. No court has
yet ruled on the constitutionality of federal intellectual property
legislation under the Commerce Clause.197 While several authors
have argued the constitutionality or constitutional basis of Congressio-
nal action in this field under the Commerce Clause, no one has raised
any argument undermining the Intellectual Property Clause time limit
requirement.19
Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. See H.R. REP. No.
282(i), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3955. The Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. 102-542, 105 Stat. 3567 (1992), relied on the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. See S. REP. No. 280, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8,
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093-94. The Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act, Pub. L. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992), relied on those two plus the Patent
Clause. See S. REP. No. 280 at 7-8, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3093-94.
In addition, many intellectual property-related industries are routinely regulated under the
Commerce Clause, for example, broadcast communications. See, e.g., Communications Act of
1934, § 1, Pub. L. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended Title 47 U.S.C.) ("For the
purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio ....
"1).
197. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds library (April 28, 1994 and April 3, 1995) ("ORPHAN
DRUG" "PLANT VARIETY" "PLANT PATENT" "SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP") /P
(CONSTITUTION! UNCONSTITUTION!) retrieved 17 cases, none on point. The only case
remotely on point was Yoder Bros. v. California-Flopida Plant Corp., 537 F. 2d 1347, 1382 n.40
(5th Cir. 1976) (regarding patentability of recurring/sports) ("We do not regard this argument as
one attacking the constitutionality of the Plant Patent Act; rather it simply inquires how broadly
the Act can be read consistent with the Constitution."). Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds library
(Apr. 29, 1994 and April 3, 1995) ("DRUG PRICE COMPETITION" "PATENT TERM
RESTORATION" 98-417)/P (CONSTITUTION! UNCONSTITUTION!) & DATE(AFTER
1983) retrieved no cases. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds library (May 6, 1994 and April 3, 1995)
((animal verterinari) /s (drug patent)) /p (constitution! unconstitution!) & date(after 1987)
retrieved none on point. No cases on Pub L. 100-670 address its constitutionality.
198. On the Semiconductor Chip Act, see Kenneth J. Burchfiel, The Constitutional
Intellectual Property Power: Progress of Useful Arts and the Legal Protection of Semiconductor
Technology, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 473 (1988) (the Necessary and Proper Clause combined
with the Patent Clause would have been sufficient basis for the Semiconductor Chip Act; the
Court erred in holding the nonobviousness standard for patentability is constitutionally
mandated). But see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power:
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993) (arguing that
"proper" has separate meaning from "necessary" and should narrow reading of the Sweeping
Clause).
Regarding the Orphan Drug Act (hereinafter "ODA"), John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act:
An Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (1992), attacks the
ODA as an unconstitutional by pass of the Patent Clause. He claims that the ODA grants a
"seven year exclusive marketing right for drugs to treat orphan diseases [which has] all the
earmarks of the creation of a patent right" yet ignores several express limitations in the Patent
Clause. The ODA allegedly (a) fails to advance the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, (b)
fails to limit rights to inventors, and (c) fails to limit rights to discoveries. Id. at 404-06. As
originally passed, because it was limited to unpatentable drugs and granted benefits to drug
companies. Flynn is clearly correct regarding points (b) and (c). The validity of point (a)
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE STATES? SUGGESTING
CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PREEMPTION
If the federal government is constitutionally prevented from
granting temporally unlimited intellectual property rights, can the
states offer rights that Congress may not? This question presents two
issues: (1) direct constitutional limits on the states, and (2) statutory
preemption (indirect constitutional limits through the Supremacy
Clause). I defer to the multitudinous articles already written on
depends on whether the Patent Clause should help advance only useful knowledge, or additionally
reaches improvements in the availability of that knowledge's benefits to additional users. Either
is arguable; the history of the clause is obviously unclear. One suggestion classified as an
unadopted alternative to the Intellectual Property Clause is a governmental power "to establish
. . . rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufac-
tures." JAMES MADISON, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAFF, supra note 96, at 64. This targets use of
knowledge, but it was not adopted. Court dicta suggests that use of knowledge is relevant:
The authority of Congress [in enacting patent statutes] is exercised in the hope that the
productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the
emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1979) (citing Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
The ODA, therefore, is close, but just misses fulfilling two (or three) requirements of the
Patent Clause. This is certainly reason for suspicion. It does grant rights only for limited
times-matching a fourth requirement. However, while the issue is dose, I think the benefit
created by the ODA is too remote from an IER to offend the Patent Clause; I would not classify
it as exclusive. The "exclusivity" granted the drug company that adopts an orphan drug is
limited in two ways: (1) it deals only with sales of the drug for use to treat a specific disease, and
(2) it is conditioned on the company's fulfilling the public demand for the good. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360cc (1988).
Flynn argues that the Orphan Drug Amendments Act is an unconditional grant of additional
rights without the quid pro quo of an additional discovery. I fail to find any textual support for
such a requirement. Extension terms are a possible explanation for the Constitution's use of the
plural "times." Congress has made many other grants of patent term extensions. See, e.g., Patent
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1861); An Act to provide for the
extension of the term of certain patents of persons who served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during World War II, Pub. L. 81-598, 64 Stat. 316 (1950), as amended by An
Act to amend the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the extension of the term of certain patents
of persons who served in the military or naval forces of the United States during World War II,"
Pub. L. 82-437, 66 Stat. 321 (1952); An Act Providing for an Extension Until April 21, 1992 of
Five Patents Relating to Oral Hypoglycemic Drugs of the Sulfonylurea Class, Priv. L. 98-46, 98
Stat. 3434 (1984) (extending patents number 3,426,067; 3,454,645; 3,507,954; 3,507,961;
3,669,966).
Robert M. Patti, Section 202 of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act-Has Congress Acted Constitutionally?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 567, 567
(1987), denounces Section 202 as an unconstitutional diminution of patent rights. This section
redefines patent infringement to allow generic drug companies to import and use otherwise
infringing generic drugs for the sole purpose of obtaining FDA marketing approval so that they
may compete with patent-holders as soon as the patents expire. This is, however, a mere partisan
reading of statutory terms into the more sparse language of the Constitution.
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statutory preemption. 199 I suggest, instead, that state protection of
intellectual property rights is otherwise constitutionally barred. Four
slightly different theories support this conclusion. In roughly
descending order of analytic rigor, they are: (1) statutory/constitutional
preemption created by the Intellectual Property Clause in combination
with any federal legislation under that Clause prevents state action in
this realm, (2) constitutional preemption by the Intellectual Property
Clause itself prevents state regulation, (3) a dormant Intellectual
Property Clause prevents state intellectual property regulation, and (4)
the intersection of the Intellectual Property Clause and the dormant
Commerce Clause prevents such state regulation. For simplicity, (at
least initially) I will refer to these theories en mass as the "dormant
Intellectual Property Clause."
The Intellectual Property Clause does not mention the states. Nor
does it declare congressional power to be exclusive or tied to nationally
uniform laws.200 No constitutional clause expressly prohibits state
legislation over intellectual property.2°1 Curtis asserts that the power
to legislate on intellectual property was "surrendered by the states to
the general government," but his only basis for this argument is the
states' pre-Constitution legislation on the subject 202 -hardly determi-
native. After all, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
203
Furthermore, some authority exists for the proposition that the
Intellectual Property Clause was intended, or originally considered, to
be a non-exclusive grant to Congress. The Intellectual Property
Clause gives Congress "power," not "the power," to promote science
and the useful arts by granting exclusive rights-even though "the"
had appeared in earlier drafts. 2 4  Tucker's 1803 edition of Black-
199. See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 509. However,
if Congress intended to allow unlimited life to functional marks, this intent might undermine any
argument that Congress' intentions would be thwarted by such state grants after Congress' actions
were invalidated.
200. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, l. 17 ("The Congress shall have power ... To exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over... the Seat of the Government of the United
States .... ") and U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,
and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
201. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty .....
202. 1 CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 96, at 532; see also 2 CURTIS,
HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, supra note 96, at 339.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
204. The argument that the Intellectual Property Clause is a non-exclusive grant was made
to the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 85-87 (1824) (remarks of
1995)
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stone's Commentaries, with comments about the new United States
Constitution, listed intellectual property as a possibly concurrent
power.2"5  At least two "Framers" apparently did not see state grants
as prohibited by the Constitution. 26 Furthermore, the Federalists
argued to numerous state ratifying conventions that no implied powers
existed in the proposed federal government. 207  This is an important
point if the binding "original intent" is that of the ratifiers of the
Constitution.
Despite evidence to the contrary, Nicklin argues that the grant to
the federal government is, indeed, exclusive.208 He rests his argu-
ment on the nature of the grant which, he asserts, meets Hamilton's
test2°9 of being "necessarily exclusive ... from the nature of the
grant." His exposition is, however, more confusing than persua-
sive. 10 Nicklin's dated analysis ignores the possibility of powers that
attorney for respondent). The Court did not rule on the Intellectual Property Clause in Gibbons.
See infia note 227. Justice Johnson declared the article irrelevant in the Commerce Clause. See
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 226 ("It is not material, in my view of the subject, to inquire
whether the article a or the should be prefixed to the word 'power."').
205. See 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, app.
Note D, View of the Constitution of the United States 265 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) ("This
is another branch of federal authority, in which I presume the states may possess some degree of
concurrent right within their respective territories .... ).
206. Mr. Jay and Chief Justice Lansing, as members of the New York Council of Revision,
were involved with one of the series of state grants of the exclusive right to use steam-driven boats
to navigate New York State waters that triggered Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Both men objected to the grant-but on policy, not constitutional, grounds. See id. at 80
(remarks of attorney for respondent). However, this was before other states acted in retaliation,
see id. at 17 (remarks of attorney for petitioner), and the grant in question was not premised on
invention, see, e.g., id. at 58, 142 (remarks of attorney for respondent), though the U.S. Attorney
considered this a subterfuge. See id. at 173-74. At the time the Supreme Court heard argument
in Gibbons, no federal patent had been issued on a steam boat. See id. at 84 (remarks of attorney
for respondent). Lansing had been at the Constitutional Convention. See PRESCOTT, supra note
96, at 20-22. While Jay did not attend the convention, see id., he was one of the authors of the
FEDERALIST PAPERS. See FEDERALIST NoS. 2-5, 64 (E.H. Scott ed. 1894).
207. M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS 75 (1993).
208. Nicklin, supra note 106, at 276-79.
209. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894) ("This
exclusive delegation or rather this alienation of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases;
where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it
granted in one instance an authority to the Union and in another prohibited the States from
exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.").
210.
The [Constitution says] that (C]ongress shall have power to secure the exclusive
right of authors and inventors "for limited times." Now, if a state have [sic] a
concurrent power with [C]ongress over the subject, it must be a power arising from the
unceded portion of its sovereignty, and, consequently, a power to grant without limit of
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time. But how could [C]ongress secure to the author or inventor, for a limited time, the
enjoyment of that which a state might grant to another forever.
It was said, indeed, by one of the most able judges that ever sat in our state courts,
"that if an author or inventor, instead of resorting to the act of [Clongress, should apply
to the state legislature for an exclusive right to his production, there is nothing to
prevent the state from granting such exclusive privilege, provided it be confined, in its
exercise, to the particular jurisdiction." . . . [I]f [this] opinion be correct, one, of two
things, must follow--either that [C]ongress may secure to an author or inventor an
exclusive right to his writing or discovery, and a state, following so far the example of
[C]ongress, as to regard commentators, or even interpolators, as authors, within the
statute, secure to another person the exclusive right to publish the same production,
within its own jurisdiction; or that [C]ongress cannot secure such right to the former,
after the state has secured it to the latter. In the first conclusion, this consequence
seems to be involved, that [C]ongress may grant an exclusive right to one person, to the
use or benefit of a certain thing, throughout the union, and that a state may grant to
another an exclusive right to the use and benefit of the same thing, within its particular
jurisdiction; in other words, that over the same subjects, and within the same
jurisdiction, two co-ordinate powers may grant exclusive privileges to different persons!
The other branch of the dilemma, supposes the individual state to derogate, by an
assumption of power, from the express terms of its grant to the general government, and
actually to exercise an exclusive power to secure privileges, in direct contradiction to the
terms of the power ceded to [C]ongress. Nor does it... obviate this repugnancy, to
say, that "when these separate powers come into direct conflict, the grant of the state
must yield to the supreme law of the land"-because the repugnance is, from the nature
of the subject... directly deducible from the propositions themselves, and not from any
casual effects or consequences arising from the accidental collision of concurrent
jurisdictions.
The power in question is moreover exclusive, from the nature of the grant; because
if each state [has] a concurrent power with [Clongress, its exercise would defeat the two
fold object, for which the federal [C]onstitution intended to provide. That object...
was to secure to the public the benefit and transmission of inventions, as well as to
secure to genius a reward for its productions and discoveries. But if the individual
states have a concurrent power with [C]ongress, neither branch of this double object can
be secured by the federal legislature. For, if to secure the first, [C]ongress prescribe
twenty-eight years as the limit of exclusive rights, and render them common at the
expiration of that period, each state might fix a different period, or secure a right of
property to authors and inventors without any limitation of time. Nor could the second
branch of the object be secured by [Clongress, if the states could exercise a concurrent
power, because each state might, on that supposition, reduce the term of exclusive
enjoyment to a minimum, or declare the fruits of genius and learning to be common
property.
Nicklin, supra note 106, at 277-79.
Nicklin's quote from "one of the most able judges" refers to Chief Justice Kent's opinion in
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 580-81 (N.Y. Ch. 1811) (Kent, C.J.), affd sub nom.,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488 (N.Y. 1820), rev'd, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that
New York's grant of exclusive rights to use steam navigation on New York's waterways violates
the active Commerce Clause and declining to reach the Intellectual Property Clause). Chief Judge
Kent's mention of perpetual patent rights was dicta. New York had only granted a twenty-year
term. Id. at 572. Furthermore, the New York grant was not made to appellants "as inventors of
the steam-boat." Id. at 583.
Nicklin's argument deserves the limited skepticism granted attorneys speaking for clients.
His main thesis is that the Constitution, as well as good policy, requires Congress to grant
copyright protection to the works of foreign authors who do not reside inside the United States.
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are neither totally exclusive nor totally concurrent-a possibility that
we now take for granted in dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. 211  Furthermore, it assumes that all AERs and IERs are
"copyrights" or "patents."
The Supreme Court's pronouncements also ignore the possibility
that some, but not all, state actions may violate the Constitution's
grant of power to the federal government. The Court, in Kewanee Oil
v. Bicron Corp.,212 declared that the Intellectual Property Clause does
not limit the states:
In the 1972 Term, in Goldstein v. California,1 3 we held that
the cl. 8 grant of power to Congress was not exclusive and that, at
least in the case of writings, the States were not prohibited from
encouraging and protecting the efforts of those within their borders
by appropriate legislation....
Just as the States may exercise regulatory power over writings
so may the States regulate with respect to discoveries.... The only
limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of laws in this
area passed by Congress .... 214
Kewanee accepts, rather than rethinks, the statement in Goldstein. This
is unfortunate, as Goldstein is a good example of bad law made by a
hard case. To be even more precise, the case exemplifies the two-sided
focus of the adversary system allowing black-hat/white-hat rhetoric to
distract the Court from public domain values.21
See Nicklin, supra note 106, at 297.
211. A "dormant" Commerce Clause barring some state action was seemingly first
mentioned (in dicta, the statute was upheld) in 1829. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982) (quoting Wilson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (Chief Justice Marshall giving the opinion of the
Court) ("We do not think that the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to
place a dam across the creek, can ... be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in this dormant state .... ). Eule argues that Congress no longer needs help from
the courts to balance national and state commercial interests. Rather, he suggests that the
dormant Commerce Clause should be used for representation-reinforcement to by pass the
incorrect exclusion of corporations from the Privileges and Immunities Clause). Eule, supra, at
428.
212. 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that patent law does not preempt state trade secret law).
213. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
214. Id. at 478-79 (citations omitted).
215. See also International News Svc. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (copying facts
from publicly posted broadsheets is illegal misappropriation); see also Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Svc. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the
compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation .... [But] this is ... the essence
of copyright .... The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors, but
to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.") (internal citations and quotation marks
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Goldstein involved a California statute216 criminalizing "record
piracy, '  a pejorative label highlighting the moralistic stance of the
Court. Defendants had bought records and tapes offered for public
sale and had made multiple rerecordings that they then offered for sale
in competition with the originals. At the time of the copying, the
federal copyright statute did not bar such behavior. However, while
the case was pending, the 1909 Copyright Act was amended to bar
similar, later activity." Seemingly, both Congress and California
considered such behavior harmful. California characterized its statute
as a "valid exercise of the police power" targeting "larceny. "219
The California statute under which defendants were convicted
gave the first recorder perpetual rights against this type of copying. If
the states were covered by the Intellectual Property Clause, the statute
that defendants violated was unconstitutional because it lacked a time
limit. If the constitutional grant of power over Intellectual Property to
the federal government was exclusive, the statute that defendants
violated was unconstitutional because the state lacked power to enact
legislation on the subject.
The Court found the language of the Constitution definitive on
the first constitutional argument. Because Article I, § 8 is addressed
to Congress, it does not bind the states.220  The Court also held that
the grant to the federal government is non-exclusive. 21 It failed to
omitted); International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 263 ("The rule for which plaintiff contends would
effect an important extension of property rights and a corresponding curtailment of the free use
of knowledge and of ideas.") (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pollack, supra note 36, at 1392-97
(arguing that same problem leads to over expansion of trademark protection). Unsurprisingly,
International News Service was cited repeatedly in the Goldstein briefs. See, e.g., Brief of
Respondent at v., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (No. 71-1192) (listing International
News Service as cited on four pages); RIAA Brief at v. (listing cites to International News Service
on six pages and in one footnote).
216. 412 U.S. at 546 & n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h).
217. Id. at 548.
218. Id. at 551-52.
219. Respondent's Brief at 7, Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1192); see also id. ("The
beneficiaries of this [larceny] .. .will not be the public or any of the composers, performers,
musicians or technicians whose skill has made the recordings possible, but only a parasitic group
of record pirates who create nothing, who add nothing to the store of human culture and
knowledge, and who live off the artistry, work and invested capital of others."); see also Brief of
the People of the State of California Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Goldstein, 412
U.S. 546 (No. 91-1192) ("[It is estimated by reliable trade sources that the annual volume of
such piracy is now in excess of $100 million. It has been estimated that legitimate pre-recorded
tape sales have an annual value of approximately $300 million.") (citation omitted).
220. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560. The Court also threw in a make weight argument-such
a perpetual copyright granted by a state would not be as dangerous as one granted by the federal
government. Id. at 560-61.
221. Id. at 559.
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discuss the possibility of anything like a dormant Copyright Clause,
but instead skipped directly to the standard statutory preemption, the
Supremacy Clause. While "it is difficult to see how the concurrent
exercise of the power to grant copyrights by Congress and the States
will necessarily and inevitably lead to difficulty, ' 222 the Court erred
in believing that "[n]o reason exists why Congress must take affirma-
tive action either to authorize protection of all categories of writings or
to free them of all restraint." 223 The usefulness of a dormant Intellec-
tual Property Clause would be to invalidate state statutes which
individually interfere with constitutional values.
The Court had little help on this issue from the briefs2 24 or oral
argument. 25  Few of the written submissions discussed any constitu-
222. Id.
223. Id. at 560.
224. The confusion dated from the original appeal:
3) California Penal Code Section 653(h) conflicts directly with Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution and the implementing Federal Statutes
because it establishes a State Copyright:
4) California Penal Code Section 653(h) conflicts directly with Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution and the implementing Federal Statutes
because it prohibits copying of public domain matter for unlimited times.
Grounds for Appeal and Designation of Record certified by Judge Auerbach of the Municipal
Court, reprinted in Appendix in the Supreme Court of the United States at 29, Goldstein, 412 U.S.
546 (No. 71-1192). Similarly, the question presented for review to the Supreme Court was "May
the State of California, through its criminal laws, grant copyright protection for unlimited times
to sound recordings in the Public Domain, in direct conflict with Article I, § 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution and the implementing Federal Copyright laws and policy." Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the County of Los
Angeles, State of California, Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1192). The petitioners argued only
preemption: the effect of the Copyright Act with the Supremacy Clause. Brief of Petitioners,
Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1192). In reply, petitioners also argued (1) that the California
penal code unconstitutionally protected items already in the public domain, citing Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (patent case holding that 'nonobviousness' is a constitutional require-
ment for patentability), see Reply Brief of Petitioners at 6 n.5; and (2) unconstitutionally created
perpetual rights, see id. at 9-11 (not clear if this argument reaches Intellectual Property Clause in
absence of any federal statutes).
225. The Court asked:
Do you think State action of this sort is unconstitutional by virtue of [the]
supremacy clause or that it would be unconstitutional by virtue of the patent grant to
Congress in the Constitution, even if Congress had never implemented its authority
under that grant?
to which Petitioner replied:
I think it would be unconstitutional under both clauses, your Honor.
I think that Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, is a grant of authority and a grant of
power to the Congress.
When read in connection with Madison's Federalist, I think he makes it as clear as
possible, and I believe going back to the Banks case, Banks v. Manchester, [128 U.S. 244
(1888) (reporter of state court cannot obtain statutory copyright in decisions written by
judges and does not have common law copyright in those decisions)] way back in 1888,
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tional issue except standard statutory preemption.226  The few
arguments mentioning possible direct Intellectual Property Clause
limitations on the states were conclusory,227 which is hardly surpris-
I believe it was, this Court held that this power to make copyright rested only by the
Constitution within Congress.
But, I think we needn't find that in this case, because I think in this case we have
a dear legislative intent as expressed for a number of years, from 1909 through 1972,
that you either find your rights under the Copyright Law or you don't frnd your rights
at all.
Oral Argument at 13-14, Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1192) (Dec. 13, 1972) (GPO
microfiche). Respondent's argument to the Court was the absence of preemption.
"Q[uestion by Court:] Isn't that the basis of your argument, that there is no Federal
Preemption of this particular segment? [Respondent:] Correct, Your Honor. There is no Federal
preemption." Id. at 33.
226. The following merit filings limited constitutional discussion to statutory preemption:
Brief for Petitioners, Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1191); Brief of Respondent; Brief Amici
Curie for Custom Recording Tape Co., et. al.; Brief of the People of the States of California
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondent; Brief and Appendix of the Attorney General of the
State of Florida, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent; Brief of the Attorney General of the
State of New York, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Consumer Protection and Affirmance; Brief of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Amicus Curiae; Brief of the State of Tennessee, Amicus
Curiae, in Support of the California Penal Code Provision § 654H Which Protects Property
Rights of Citizens From Traffic in Illicit and Contraband Property; Brief of the Attorney General
of the State of Texas, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent and the California Penal Code
Provision § 653H; Brief of Information Industry Association Amicus Curiae; and Brief of the
Harry Fox Agency, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
All amici curiae, except Custom Recording Tape Co., et. al., supported California. See briefs
listed earlier in this footnote; Brief of Recording Indus. Association of America, Inc., Amicius
Curiae (hereinafter RIAA Brief); Brief Amici Curiae For American Federation of Musicians and
American Federation of Telephone and Radio Artists (hereinafter AFM Brief). Merit fillings
with some material on possible Intellectual Property Clause limitations directly on the states were
RIAA Brief; AFM Brief; Reply Brief of Petitioners; and [Respondent's] Post-Argument
Memorandum.
227. RIAA asserted that Supreme Court case law recognized "the continuing validity of state
protection in the field of common law copyright," RIAA Brief at 33, and that "[tihe copyright
clause of the Constitution does not its own force preempt state law." Id. at 34 n.89 (citing
Arnold, supra note 163, at 420-21; Comment, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 178, 183 (1968). The
Comment refers briefly to materials discussed elsewhere in this article. Arnold's article cannot
be taken seriously on this point. Discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, he put the words of the attorneys
for the respondent into the mouth of Chief Justice Marshall. Marshall's only comment on the
Intellectual Property Clause was: "As this [discussion of the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses]
decides the cause, it is unnecessary to enter in an examination of that part of the Constitution
which empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221 (1824); accord John W. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v.
Beckett: An Inquiry Into the Constitutional Distribution of Powers Over the Law of Literay Property
in the United States-Part 11, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 194, 197 (1962). Nor can we
be sure to what extent the New York state grant (which was not based on invention) survived the
Supreme Court's pronouncement. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Licensing Executives Society
at 52 & n.36, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (No. 73-187). The New
York Chancellor in a later case issued an injunction barring a federally licensed steam boat from
traveling between Troy, N.Y. and New York City, N.Y. but refused to grant one barring trips
inside New York with stops in other states. Only the refusal of the interstate injunction was
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appealed. North River Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 711, 739 (N.Y. 1825). The
appellate court affirmed the denial, id. at 756, but dearly indicated that, if appealed, it would have
reversed the limited injunction which had been granted. Id. at 750 ("[T]he commerce subject to
the control of congress, is the coasting trade .... [Including all rivers approachable from the
coasts .... [T]he [defendant's enjoined vessel] ... had a perfect right to the navigation of the
Hudson ."). But see id. at 754-55 (state retains exclusive right to regulate solely internal
commerce which includes ferries and canals). RIAA also declared, citing but not discussing two
secondary authorities, that "the historical background of the copyright clause makes it clear that
the 'limited times' phrase was intended only as a restraint on federal power and does not limit the
states with respect to common law copyright in unpublished works." RIAA Brief at 34, Goldstein,
412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1192). RIAA did not bother to analyze the possible importance of a change
to state statutory protection of writings. But, as Kaplan notes, "[it seems unlikely that the
validity of the state regulation in relation to the copyright clause would be made to turn on
whether it emanated from the state's legislature or its courts. Cf. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)." Kaplan, supra note 161, at 419 n.41.
RIAA's first authority is Howard I. Kalodner & Verne W. Vance, Jr., The Relation Between
Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (1959) (cited
in RIAA Brief at 34 nn.90, 91). Kalodner begins with Learned Hands' dissent in Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664-68 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J.,
dissenting). Kalodner & Vance, supra, at 1080. The case turned on whether divestive publication
of an artist's performance on a commercially distributed record had destroyed state protection of
the performance. Unlike the majority in Capitol Records, Hand considered "publication" to be
an issue of federal law. He considered this necessary because the performance was a "writing,"
Congress could only grant protection to "writings" for "limited times," and the Federal Copyright
Act ended state protection at divestive "publication." Kalodner interprets Hand as claiming that
the Copyright Clause's "limited times" language directly binds the states. Kalodner, supra, at
1082-83; see also Kaplan, supra note 161, at 412-13 (Learned Hand's dissent rested on direct
connection of Copyright Clause with states and on a policy of nationally uniform intellectual
property law); Paul Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 49, 51 (1969) ("Judge Hand viewed the copyright clause of the constitution, particularly its
restriction of congressional protection to 'limited times,' as a mandate with which both state and
federal regulation must comply."). Kalodner's argument against a direct tie between the
Intellectual Property Clause and the states is neither new, overwhelming, nor relevant to
dormancy:
It is submitted that the limited-times policy is not applicable to the states. A
contrary view would probably mean that state grants of perpetual protection of
unpublished works are invalid, a conclusion which opposes many years of practice and
general assumption. The words of the clause do not refer to the states, and traditionally
courts have refused to apply constitutional limitations to governmental units not
specifically included within the scope of the limitation. This is particularly true in
regard to the states, which are not governments of enumerated powers but of residual
power subject to enumerated restraints.
If the clause is read as an expression [of] ... policies [on writings, authors, and
time limits], it is not easy to understand why one should limit the states while the others
do not. It seems more persuasive to argue either that all apply to the states or that none
does. The arguments against applying the limited-times policy to the states indicate
that none of the policies should apply.
Kalodner, supra, at 1085, 1086. But see Whicher, Part I, supra note 105, at 150 & n.168 (arguing
that a time limit counted from publication, an event which may not happen, is just as much a
time limit as the statute of limitations for fraud which runs from when a reasonably diligent
plaintiff would have discovered the fraud, an event which may never happen). Kaplan, see AFM
Brief at 8 n.2, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (No. 71-1191), supplies no further
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hmg considering the murky history of the Clause.22 Even such
luminaries as Story have found that the tie between the states and the
Intellectual Property Clause is unclear.229 The Court addressed
Hamilton's famous list of three ways in which the Constitution bars
state actions.23 0 However, the Court ignored the fact that Hamilton's
comments predated creation of dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine23' and ignored the possibility that some, but not all, state
actions in an area might be barred directly by the Constitution.232
In Kewanee, the Court uncritically involved the reasoning in
Goldstein. Kewanee involved trade secrets. After a long trial, the
district court granted an injunction permanently barring defendants
from using certain processes and information obtained from the
plaintiffs former employees. On appeal, the judgment was reversed
because the district court had granted perpetual protection for
patentable subject matter. Though the Sixth Circuit had not men-
tioned the issue,233 the Supreme Court in Kewanee explicitly denied
that the Intellectual Property Clause directly barred state action. 34
analysis. He admits Learned Hand's position has "some force" but he is "against the current of
interpretation of other powers conferred on Congress by the Constitution." Kaplan concludes that
because Congress can always preempt the states by legislation, "it is doubtful" that the "history
or intrinsic purpose" of the Intellectual Property Clause directly limits the states. Kaplan, supra
note 161, at 420-21. The problem with perpetual protection of unpublished works is easily met
by (1) construing limited times to refer to an economic return limit, see supra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text, and (2) making any more than minimally economically productive use of a
work a divestive publication, thus following Hand's intelligent lead. See Capitol Records, 221 F.2d
at 667 (commercial distribution of a record is divestive publication of the artists' performances)
(Hand, J., dissenting); see also Kaplan, supra note 161, at 425-26 (listing oddities of then-current
"divestive publication" doctrine).
RIAA's second authority is Whicher, Part I, supra note 105. Whicher is also relied upon
by respondents. See Post-Argument Memorandum [of Respondent] at 11, Goldstein, 412 U.S.
546 (No. 71-1192). Whicher's interesting historical theory is discussed in the text. See infra
notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
229. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1154, at 84 (5th ed. 1891) (stating that it is a "matter for grave inquiry" whether states
have concurrent power over intellectual property if they do not contravene federal statutes); cf.,
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220-21 (1954) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (noting that central term
"writings" in Intellectual Property Clause is unclear) ("The constitutional materials are quite
meager [and] much research is needed.").
230. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 552; see also supra note 210.
231. See supra note 211, and accompanying text.
232. Justice Johnson approached this possibility in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
228 (1824) ("Power to regulate foreign commerce, is given in the same words, and in the same
breath, as it were, with that over the commerce of the States and with the Indian tribes. But the
power to regulate foreign commerce is necessarily exclusive.").
233. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S.
470 (1974).
234. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1974).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 18:259
As in Goldstein, neither oral argument235 nor the briefs pointed the
Court toward a dormant Intellectual Property Clause.
236
235. Only once did oral argument touch constitutional, as opposed to statutory, preemption:
[General Griswold, counsel for petitioner:]
In the last term, in Goldstein v. California, this Court refused to find such an effect
in the constitutional provision, which is identical with respect to copyrights and patents,
and refused to find it as a matter not covered by the patent law as enacted by the-by
the copyright law as enacted by Congress.
And we submit that the same conclusion should be reached here with respect to
the impact of the patent laws on the state law of trade secrets.
Question [from the Court]: General Griswold, there were some of us who
dissented in Goldstein last term. Do you think our position is inconsistent with yours
here?
Mr. Griswold: No, I do not think so, Mr. Justice.
Oral Argument at 11, Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. 470 (No. 73-187) (Jan. 9, 1974) (GPO microfiche).
236. Several additional constitutional arguments were made, but no one suggested a dormant
Intellectual Property or Commerce Clause analysis. Trade secrets were argued as outside the
Intellectual Property Clause because unlike IER's they (1) protect privacy interests, see Brief for
Amicus Curiae Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n at 23, Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. 470 (No. 73-187), (2)
grant non-exclusive rights, see id., (3) are not offered specifically to inventors, see Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Licensing Executives Society at 51, and (4) are intended to promote ethics, rather
than progress. Id. at 50. One amicus curiae argued that the Intellectual Property Clause allowed
Congress "to 'secure,' i.e., expand, inventors' common law rights--for a limited time-against
both later inventors and copiers," but not to "limit [pre-existing] common law rights of inventors"
to practice their inventions in secrecy; protecting such common law rights was a power retained
by the states. Brief of the Bar Ass'n of the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae at 9, 10
[hereinafter "DC Brief"]. But see supra note 106 and accompanying text (meaning of 'secure').
SCM Corp. raised several interesting arguments. First, "the intent of the Constitutional Framers
as to trade secrets was non-existent" because "no common law right in trade secrets or inventions
[was] generally recognized prior to the adoption of the Constitution." Brief Amicus Curiae of
SCM Corp. at 30, 31 [hereinafter "SCM Brief']. But see D.C. Brief, supra, asserting common
law rights existed pre-Constitution. Second, "[g]rants ... of exclusionary rights in science and
useful arts which have the net effect of retarding or even stifling progress are, regardless of
purpose, in the teeth of the Constitutional mandate for promotion of progress in these fields."
SCM Brief at 32. However, this statement is merely a preamble to a statutory preemption
argument. See id. Third, trade secret law is "repugnan[t] .. .to the property right of every
citizen, arising under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to utilize fully his own talents and
skills in pursuit of a lawful trade or calling." Id. at 45 (largely relying on Edward S. Irons and
Mary Helen Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention-The Touchstone for Patent Reform,
attached as appendix to SCM Brief at 4a-50a, later version printed in 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653).
Respondents declined to take a position on non-statutory preemption. See Brief for
Respondents at 8. Many briefs merely relied on the Court's logic in Goldstein, arguing that
"discoveries" must be treated identically to "writings" under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8. See
Brief for the Petitioner at 25 n.7; Brief Amicus Curiae for the Budd Co. at 4; Brief of Amicus
Curiae for Burroughs Corp.; Brief Amicus Curiae for R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. at 6; Brief
for the New York Patent Law Association as Amicus Curiae at 13-15; Brief Amicus Curiae for
Rohr Industries, Inc. Thirteen merits briefs did not mention non-statutory preemption. See Brief
Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association; Brief for the Association for the Advancement
of Invention & Innovation as Amicus Curiae; Brief on the Merits for the American Patent Law
Association, Amicus Curiae; Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner; Brief of the Electronic Industries Association as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner; Brief for Arnicus Curiae National Patent Council, Inc. for Itself and Representing
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John F. Whicher, however, has presented an interesting,
historically-based theory that the "limited times" provision was
addressed solely to the federal government.237 Whicher points to the
English controversy over the continued existence of perpetual common
law copyrights after the Statute of Anne,238 which is the same
material relied upon by Crosskey.2 39 To drastically oversimplify,
before the Statute of Anne, individual printers had exclusive, perpetual
rights to reprint specific works-however, such rights were ineffective
because the printer needed to prove actual damages. The Statute of
Anne gave authors a limited term of copyright during which they could
obtain confiscation and destruction of the infringing copies and
damages based on the number of infringing copies in the defendant's
possession. The words of the statute were unclear as to whether it
created better remedies for a limited term or constricted the term of the
underlying right. In 1769, Millar v. Taylor240 held that the common
law right was perpetual. In 1774, Donaldson v. Beckett24' held that
the common law right was terminated by the statutory, limited grant.
Whicher contends that, when the Constitution was written and
ratified, American lawyers were unaware of Donaldson.242 Thus, the
Framers intended the "limited times" in the Intellectual Property
Clause to bar the federal government from providing excessive
remedies for the perpetual period of the common law monopoly. To
this point, Whicher's analysis would seem to be a more detailed
support of Crosskey's analysis.243  The two historians strongly
National Small Business Association, Inc.; Brief of the Ohio State Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner; Brief for Amicus Curiae Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc.; Brief
of Southwire Co. as Amicus Curiae; Supplemental Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae;
Supplemental Brief of Respondents Bicron Corp. et al. in Response to the "Brief of the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae"; Supplemental Brief Amicus Curiae [of SCM Corp.]; Reply Brief for the Petitioner.
237. Whicher, Part I, supra note 105. Whicher's article was cited to the Court in Goldstein.
RIAA Brief at 34 & nn.90, 91, Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1191).
238. Statute-of Anne, 8 Anne C. 19 (1709) (Eng.).
239. 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 105, at 480-86.
240. 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
241. 2 Bro. P.C. 129; 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
242. See Whicher, Part I, supra note 105, at 133. Whicher primarily bases this on their
limited access to updated legal books:
The fact is worth stressing that it was the fourth edition of Blackstone's treatise
[Commentaries on the Laws of England], originally published after the case of Millar v.
Taylor had been decided but before that decision had been overruled by Donaldson v.
Beckett, which was thus sown broadcast in pre-Revolutionary America.
Id. In addition, Madison's defense of the Clause in the Federalist echoes the natural rights
language of Blackstone's fourth edition. Id.
243. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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disagree, however, over whether the colonists were hostile to perpetual
common law rights when limited to individual colonies.244
Whicher arguably shows: (1) the Framers believed in the
existence of perpetual, common law copyright; (2) the Framers
construed common law rights as waived in any jurisdiction where the
author did not arrange publication of his work; (3) the Framers wanted
to limit nationally effective copyrights; and (4) the Framers could
reasonably have intended short-term national protection to co-exist
with perpetual, but merely local, rights. Whicher, however, overreach-
es his evidence by asserting it proves the Framers were approving the
continuation of the perpetual common law right in individual states.
What Whicher fails to show is that the Framers, even if they did
choose concurrent federal/state power,245 chose to make the state
power temporally unlimited 6.24  He totally ignores the Framers'
choice not to use natural rights language in the Clause.247 Whicher
strongly relies upon the undisputed existence of concurrent federal and
state protection of unpublished manuscripts from the first federal
copyright statute in 1790 until the adoption of the 1909 Copyright
Act.24 ' This is not determinative, however. As Whicher himself
points out, "limited times" measured from publication (a future act
which may never occur), would make sense to attorneys accustomed to
a statute of limitations for fraud measured from discovery (a future act
which may never occur).249  Whicher contends that Madison's
244. See Whicher, Part I, supra note 105, at 139-41 & n.125 (citing historical evidence that
he argues shows local, perpetual common law rights were accepted). But see Sears & Irons, supra
note 151, at 667-69 (discussing historical evidence allegedly showing a strong colonial aversion
to monopolies).
245. See W&icher, Part I, supra note 105, at 146-51.
246. Nor is this shown by the possibly lesser danger presented by perpetual, but merely
local, rights. But see Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560-61 ("[It is not dear that the dangers to which
this limitation was addressed apply with equal force to both the Federal Government and the
States.... [T]he exclusive right granted by a State is confined to its borders.").
247. See H.R. REP. NO. 1494, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892) (accompanying 1894 Patent
Act) ("The object to be attained and the reason for the constitutional grant of power are
embedded in the grant itself .... There is nothing said [in the Constitution] about any desire
or purpose to secure to the author or inventor his 'natural right to his property."').
248. See Whficher, Part I, supra note 105, at 146-51; see also Lewis S. Kurlantzick, The
Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REV. 204, 220 n.59
(1972). The state of California relied on this history to show that the states have concurrent
intellectual property powers. See Post-Argument Memorandum [of Respondents] at 11-13,
Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1192). But see Kurlantzick, supra, at 221 (state power to protect
unpublished works protects author's right to decide not to publish and, thus, may not be relevant
to existence of concurrent state power to protect published writings which involves author's
economic interests).
249. See Whicher, Part I, supra note 105, at 150.
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statement "[t]he public good fully coincides in both cases [authors' and
inventors' rights] with the claims of individuals,""2 ' does not under-
mine his interpretation. The sentence certainly makes more sense if all
discoveries and writings are eventually dedicated to the public.2"'
Congruently, the Patent Act of 1793 conditioned grants of a federal
patent upon relinquishment of any pre-Constitution, state-granted
patent.252
No strong, contemporary evidence of the Framers' intent has been
discovered, and modern legal theories do conflict.25 3 The Court's
best choice in interpretation may be to simply follow the language of
the Intellectual Property Clause. The Clause is addressed to Congress;
it binds only Congress. The Clause does not mention national
uniformity; it does not mandate national uniformity. No parallel clause
bars state action; the Clause, itself, does not bar state action.25 4
However, this analysis ignores the possibility of a dormant
Intellectual Property Clause. After all, the Commerce Clause is
addressed to Congress,255 does not mention uniformity, and lacks a
parallel anti-state-action clause. 256  Amusingly, Judge Kozinski ties
the existence of a "dormant Copyright Clause" to Goldstein: "Under
the dormant Commerce Clause, state intellectual property laws can
stand only so long as they don't 'prejudice the interests of other
States.'257  If, as Supreme Court dicta consistently declares,258
250. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 99, at 186.
251. Madison's early view on the value of long-term intellectual property rights is unclear;
his later belief that they are undesirable is not disputed. See Whicher, Part I, supra note 105,
at 133-36.
252. 1 Stat. 318 § 7 (repealed July 4, 1836).
253. With the exception, see supra notes 130-49 and accompanying text, that "time limits"
might be better set in terms of the economic life of the res, a theory that may render much
existing law unconstitutional.
254. But see Kurlantzick, supra note 248, at 222-23 (arguing that because of the policy
expressed in the Intellectual Property Clause, "the limited times provision applies to any state or
federal action designed to protect subject matter covered by the copyright clause") ("Given the
constitutional concern with excess protection, state power in this area should be subject to similar
limitations [on length of protection], since excessive state protection imposes the same unjustifi-
able costs as would excessive federal protection.").
255. But see Albert A. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 481-94 (1941) (arguing that the interstate
commerce clause was intended to limit state action).
256. Some "commercial" taxation is prohibited by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 2, 3.
257. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir.) (quoting
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973)) (Kozinski, J, dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
258. See supra Section IV.C.2; accord Nicklin, supra note 106, at 281 ("The ultimate object
of the power, was the advancement of science and the useful arts; the means by which [C]ongress
were to effect that end, was by securing to authors a right of property in their works for limited
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eventual dedication to the public is the central concern of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause, Learned Hand is correct in asserting that state
law allowing perpetual protection of any "writing" or "discovery" is
unconstitutional because it "prejudice[s] the interests of the other
States" and of the states united.5 9
In economic terms, the market harm from fifty states separately
granting identical perpetual protection to a res is presumably the same
as the harm from federal granting of perpetual protection in all states.
Organizing concerted action in fifty states, furthermore, would
probably involve higher transaction costs than instigating action in
Congress. If national marketing of intellectual property is more
efficient than local marketing, perpetual protection by one state
disallows use of the most efficient system.
The analytically pure approach is to point out that Hamilton left
out a possibility in Federalist No. 32:260 Some broad power delegat-
ed non-exclusively to the federal government might require for its
effectiveness that states be barred from some small group of actions,
but not all actions, in that area. I originally called this broad power a
"dormant Intellectual Property Clause" because it involves the type of
analysis involved in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence: a case-
by-case analysis, as opposed to a blanket rejection of state action in a
broad area.
As a textual matter, the Intellectual Property Clause is a more
sensible place for such case-by-case analysis than is the Commerce
Clause. Although the Commerce Clause does not state why or how
Congress should regulate commerce, the Intellectual Property Clause
periods; and the result has been a transfer to the public of a reversionary interest, in those
productions which of common right had belonged exclusively to their authors.").
259. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2nd Cir.
1955) (Hand, J., dissenting); see also supra note 227 (discussing Learned Hand's jurisprudence).
Learned Hand also saw a policy of uniformity underlying the Intellectual Property Clause:
Uniformity was one of the principal interests to be gained by devolving upon the Nation
the regulation of this subject. During the existence of the Articles of Confederation
several of the states had passed copyright laws .... [B]ut, in the 43rd number of the
Federalist, Madison made this short comment on the Clause, 'The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of these cases[.]' . .. If, for example, ....
the defendant is forbidden to make and sell these records in New York, that will not
prevent it from making and selling them in any other state which may regard the
plaintiffs [record] sales as 'publication'; and it will be practically impossible to prevent
their importation into New York. That is exactly the kind of evil at which the clause
is directed.
Capitol Records, 221 F.2d at 667 (Hand, J., dissenting). I read Madison to argue for the need for
national power to make regulation effective, rather than for a need for uniformity.
260. See supra note 209 (quoting Hamilton on exclusive delegation). One could alternatively
say he has been misinterpreted.
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gives both a purpose-to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts-and a method, by supplying, for limited times, exclusive
rights to authors and inventors. This allows courts to easily decide
whether a state has violated the clause in the absence of statutory
preemption. "Limited times" is the clearest of the textual fences in the
clause. Therefore, whatever state intellectual property regulations may
be allowable, granting perpetual AERs or IERs should be held
unconstitutional regardless of Congressional action or inaction.
Alternatively, one could label the dormant Intellectual Property
Clause a fourth type of statutory preemption 2 t1-a preemption
turning on the mere existence of any federal statute, rather than one
turning on the type, content, or extent of a federal statute. This is
possibly the most analytically satisfying explanation and may be
termed constitutional/statutory preemption.
Congress does not have to grant any AERs or IERs. If Congress
chooses not to set up a federal intellectual property system, the states
may be allowed to grant perpetual rights. However, if Congress
chooses to set up any type of AERs or IERs, the Constitution requires
the rights be for only "limited times." Once any federal system is in
place, its goal is effectively undercut by the existence of perpetual
state-created rights. A slightly more nuanced approach might look
separately to the existence of some federal action on "writings" and
some federal action on "discoveries. "262 Constitutional/statutory
preemption differs from standard statutory preemption because the
details of the federal statutory regime are irrelevant. For instance, the
courts should not consider whether Congress has chosen to protect
only different types of "writings" and "discoveries" than those targeted
by the state laws.
Such broad preemption should be triggered by any federal statute
for two reasons. First, if Congress granted rights in any area it would
either be barring otherwise possible state grants of later perpetual rights
or destroying already granted perpetual rights. Therefore, Congres-
sional action would automatically create a disincentive for progress in
that branch of science or the useful arts covered by federal statute.
261. The standard three types of statutory preemption are by express federal statutory
command, actual conflict between the dictates of federal and state statute, and congressional
enactment which "so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the [s]tates to supplement" federal statute. Cipollone v. Liggett
Gp., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
262. The need for legislation has almost always been met. Both the patent statute, Patent
Act of 1790, 1 stat. 109, and the first copyright statute, Copyright Act of 1790, 1 stat. 124, were
passed by the first Congress.
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Second, any state law granting longer, more valuable protection in one
type of writing or discovery would tend to make rights in that subject
matter more valuable than federal time-limited rights in other types of
writings or discoveries. States, therefore, not Congress, would be the
leading influence on intellectual property investment choices.
Chief Justice Marshall once articulated a similar constitution-
al/statutory preemption theory. In Sturgis v. Crowinshield,263 Mar-
shall stated in dicta that state bankruptcy statutes were preempted, not
by the existence of the constitutional grant to Congress, but by its
exercise:
If, in the opinion of Congress, uniform laws concerning
bankruptcies ought not to be established, it does not follow that
partial laws may not exist, or that State legislation on the subject
must cease. It is not the mere existence of the power, but its
exercise, which is incompatible with the exercise of the same power
by the States. It is not the right to establish these uniform laws, but
their actual establishment, which is inconsistent with the partial acts
of the States. 211
The Court may have already acted on constitutional/statutory
preemption in the Intellectual Property area without expressly
recognizing this as the basis for its action. 265  If the Intellectual
Property Clause is merely a grant of Congressional power to protect
"writings" and "discoveries," the power to legislate on non-writings
and non-discoveries (items below the constitutionally-set threshold for
AERs and IERs) must be reserved to the states. Why then did the
Court emphatically bar state protection of such lesser items?266
263. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
264. Id. at 196; accord Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 310-11, 313 (1827)
(Thompson, J., concurring in relevant part and dissenting in part).
265. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (state may not bar
copying of lamp which lacks copyright or design patent protection); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (same); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141 (1989) (state may not bar the use of plug molding to prevent cheap copying of boat hull
unprotected by patent (or copyright)). Cases are worded at different levels of generality, see
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 ("The pre-emptive sweep of our decisions in Sears and Compco has
been the subject of heated scholarly and judicial debate."), but the differences are unimportant
to my thesis.
266. My thanks to Michael B. Gerdes for clearly framing this issue, even though I disagree
with his conclusion. See Michael B. Gerdes, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated Originality
as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1465-68, (1992) (arguing
that, because power over non-original works is reserved to the states, under the authority of South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), and Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), Congress'




In Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,267 for example,
the Court overturned a state statute barring imitators from copying the
exact shape of boat hulls by the relatively inexpensive copying method
called "plug molding."
The Florida [anti-plug molding] statute is aimed directly at the
promotion of intellectual creation by substantially restricting the
public's ability to exploit ideas that the patent system mandates shall
be free for all to use. . . The Florida law substantially restricts the
public's ability to exploit an unpatented design in general circula-
tion, raising the specter of state-created monopolies in a host of
useful shapes and processes for which patent protection has been
denied or is otherwise unobtainable.2
The Court saw no tension between this statement and two others
also made in Bonito Boats: (1) "that the Patent and Copyright
Property Clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication,
deprive the States of the power to adopt rules for the promotion of
intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions,"269 and (2) that
Florida had "enter[ed] a field of regulation which the patent laws have
reserved to Congress" by "a scheme of federal regulation ... so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it."
270
The Constitution, not Congressional choice, however, makes
obvious items unprotectable by IERs 27 and non-original items
unprotectable by AERs.272  This is not a Congressional choice.
Congress cannot in any reasonable way have preempted a field over
which it has no control-unless the preemption is a constitution-
273al/statutory one.
267. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
268. Id. at 167.
269. Id. at 165.
270. Id. at 167 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
271. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
272. See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
273. Cf. Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 509, 566-75 & nn.285, 294
(arguing that several lower court cases assume copyright preemption extends beyond the express
provision, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988), because of the policy announced in the Copyright Clause).
At least one author has gone further and suggested that the Intellectual Property Clause gives
Congress the power to protect intellectual property, but not the power to place designated
intellectual property in the public domain over state objections. Therefore, to preempt state laws
granting protection, Congress must rely on the Commerce Clause. See Edward Samuels,
Comment, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copyright Preemption, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 960, 966 (1974).
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One other explanation of such preemption exists. The Court has
yet to bar a state from protecting something below the level of
originality. While most of Bonito Boats talks about patents, the Court
does point out that Congress had decided not to protect industrial
designs through copyright.274  The Court's theory may be that
Congress, by leaving items out of the Copyright Act, decided not to
protect industrial designs above originality but below nonobvious-
ness. 21 Perhaps when the Court reaches the effect of preemption on
a state law protecting non-original works, such as data bases, it will
allow the state law to stand. However, lower courts and scholars have
consistently agreed that such a state misappropriation law would be
preempted by the Copyright Act.276  From an economic rationale,
any other outcome is ludicrous.
Furthermore, while the Court has not held that the states cannot
give copyright-like rights277 to writings below the constitutional
minimum, its dicta on statutory preemption implies that it would:
"Today we have held in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., . . that
when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article.
278
The Court cannot logically hold both that the Constitution denies
Congress the power to grant AERs to items below the authorship
threshold of originality and that the Constitution gives Congress the
274. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167-68.
275. The classic trilogy of cases (Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats), deals with industrial
designs not entitled to design patents. None of these cases states that the items, which lacked
design patents or copyrights and which were below the standard for design patent protection, were
also below the standard of originality for copyright protection. This is hardly surprising as these
cases all predate Feist.
276. See NtMMER, supra note 97, § 1.1[B][2], at 1-37 through 1-38. But see ROBERT A.
GORMAN, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, in 'FACT' AND DATA PROTECTION
AFTER FEIST 47, 88-92 (Jon A. Baumgaten, ed. 1991) (discussing one case that held state law
action for misappropriation of facts was not preempted by the Copyright Act and arguing that
it incorrectly construed the Copyright Act).
277. Unlike the federal patent statutes which preempt the field, see supra note 270, and the
1909 Copyright Act, the current 1976 Copyright Act has an express preemption clause generally
barring state laws granting "legal or equitable rights... within the general scope of copyright"
as specified by the Act for any "works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified [by this Act]." 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
278. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
Even if the Court considered the articles above the "originality" standard for "writings," it
would not have needed to discuss the possible copyrightability of the lamps because copyright
protection at that time required notice on the article, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (repealed 1978). Because the
plaintiffs had claimed design patent, not copyright, they would have had no reason to publish with
copyright notice. The Court did not announce the constitutional minimum of "originality" for
"writings" until 1991. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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power to control state legislation in the exact same area.27 9 Of
course, lack of such a limitation would debilitate the AERs Congress
may grant-but that merely supports my theory of constitution-
al/statutory preemption. If challenged with this argument, the Court
could hide behind the Necessary and Proper Clause. I would consider
this to be improper, as would Justice Marshall. His expansive8 0
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Mary-
land281 instructed us to read the instrument as a whole282 and re-
peatedly pointed to the absence of language denying Congress the
power to create a national bank.
28 3
The heavy hand of precedent may, however, counsel arguing for
a different basis for the congressional limit. 84 Instead of asking the
Court to change its interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause,
we could ask the Court to hitch that Clause to the acknowledged
dormant Commerce Clause2 -as Goldstein murkily suggested.8 6
279. Michael W. McConnell has suggested one interesting alternative with which I
respectfully disagree. Congress, by the interaction of the Commerce and Intellectual Property
Clauses, may have more power to preempt than to legislate. Cf. Abrams, supra note 199.
McConnell suggests that similar logic, though unstated, underlies Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (preemption of Pennsylvania statute by the federal Fugitive Slave Act).
Comment by Michael W. McConnell during oral presentation of earlier draft at Work in
Progress, Univ. of Chicago School of Law, June 16, 1994.
280. Perhaps over-expansive, See Lawson & Granger, supra note 198, at 288-89 (stating that
while Marshall's argument about the meaning of "necessary" has force, he did not address the
meaning of "proper," perhaps because it was not relied on by the opposing attorneys).
281. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
282. Id. at 406 ("a fair construction of the whole instrument").
283. Id. at 407, 421, 423 ("[T]heir having omitted to use any restrictive term"; "all means
... which are not prohibited"; "should [C]ongress... adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution ... it would become the painful duty of this tribunal... to say, that such an act
was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited .... ).
284. For those Court-watchers who expect the Court to decline any expansion of the
dormant Commerce Clause, cf. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677,
1695 (Souter, J., dissenting); see discussion of Carbone, infra notes 304-07 and accompanying text,
overruling Goldstein might seem more practical. Kewanee is not a problem; the outcome in that
case is easily supportable even if states are covered by the Intellectual Property Clause. Trade
secrets are not IERs, because they are not exclusive; they do not grant rights against the entire
world. See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRET-S § 1.05[5] (1993) (typically state
law only protects trade secrets from improper means of discovery).
285. Numerous scholars have made similar suggestions about the active Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Ginsburg, "No Sweat," supra note 150, at 365-67 ("Whatever the accuracy of [the
assumption that records were of purely local importance in 1973 when Goldstein was decided], it
seems most implausible today, particularly in the domain of electronic databases."); Kurlantzick,
supa note 248, at 236-46 (discussing Commerce Clause limits on state bans on record piracy).
286. Chief Justice Berger used a preemption test from dormant Commerce Clause cases. See
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556-60 & n.15 (1973). Abrams deplores this strategy as
a misguided attempt to use the dissimilar Commerce Clause as an excuse to ignore the historical
jurisprudence on the Copyright Clause. See Abrams, supa note 199. at 527-30. But see Dan L.
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In 1973, the Court's assertion that records were "of purely local impor-
tance 287 failed the giggle test.28  In 1994, how can the law sensi-
bly ignore the power of computer nets, fiber optic networks, and
broadcast media to move "writings" and "discoveries" between
jurisdictions?289 Law cannot overlook the importance of "writings"
and "discoveries" in interstate and international trade. 90
Therefore, perpetual state protection of a functional mark may
also be analyzed as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 91
This argument does not require total national uniformity in trademark
law, but it does make illegitimate any state grant of perpetual
trademark protection to the limited class of marks discussed in this
article.292
Burk. Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal Preemption, 23
SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 613-14 (1993) (Abrams argument shows only that the preemptive
power of the Patent Clause would be as narrow as the Clause's scope). Burger's Goldstein analysis
could have been successful if Burger had been more realistic.
287. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558.
288. See, e.g., AFM Brief at 20-26, Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (No. 71-1192) (amassing
statistics to support the notion that "[tihe nationwide and deleterious scope of unauthorized
tapping of musical sound recordings fully justifies the exercise of California's police power to
penalize such actions."); RIAA Brief at 22-23 & n.53 (stating that ten of the states have anti-
piracy statutes).
289. Cf. Chris Conley, California Couple Found Guilty for Role in Computer Pornography
Service, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.) July 29, 1994 at 1A. A California couple
was tried in federal court in Memphis on obscenity charges based on the use of a computer
bulletin board controlled from their California home. An appeal is expected to question the
application of Memphis community standards to a California distributor in obscenity finding.
290. Publishing and printing (SIC, standard industrial dassification, 27) were responsible for
1,250 million dollars of exports in 1985 and 3,808 million dollars of exports in 1992; imports were
1,200 million dollars in 1985; 2,046 million dollars in 1992. GNP in SIC 27 was 23,326 million
dollars in 1977 and 68,236 million dollars in 1989. United States' trade in advanced technology
products generated 83.5 billion dollars in exports in 1989; 105.1 billion in 1992; such technology
was responsible for a positive United States balance of trade of 27.1 billion dollars in 1989; 33.3
billion dollars in 1992. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1993 at 819, 741, 744 (l1th ed. 1993). Note that the
classic declaration of federal primacy in commerce held that state-issued patents for steam boats
violated the Commerce Clause. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (active
Commerce Clause); see generally, JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, STEAMBOATS COME TRUE:
AMERICAN INVENTORS IN ACTION (1944) (popularly written account of the rival inventors of
steam navigation).
291. A similar argument shows that states are also barred from perpetual protection of
merely descriptive marks that are also "writings."
292. An Intellectual Property-Commerce Clause link was suggested as early as 1824, before
the advent of the dormant Commerce Clause:
I have not touched upon the right of the states to grant patents for inventions or
improvements, generally, because it does not necessarily arise in this cause. It is enough
for all the purposes of this decision, if they cannot exercise it so as to restrain a free
intercourse among the States.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
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Consider a mark that is ineligible for federal incontestable
protection because it is merely functional. Hypothesize that New York
State grants the mark in-state immortality and validates the mark's
ownership by firm Y.293 Federal law, under orders from the Intellec-
tual Property Clause, allows firm X to use the device in national
commerce. But Firm X cannot send its goods so-dressed into New
York. This clearly burdens interstate commerce.294
I will analyze the possibilities on the assumption that the
protecting state will only bar importation into the protecting state and
sale inside the protecting state.29 Congress has the option of protect-
ing, or not protecting,2 96 writings and discoveries, but, any federally
granted right must be mortal and must be limited to items meeting the
constitutional standards for "writings" and "discoveries."
Possibility one: Both the protecting state and Congress grant
protection to the res. The state grants rights in perpetuity, Congress
grants protection for "limited times." Thus, if the res is originally
protectible, under federal law it is dedicated to the public domain when
the protection ends. If the res does not meet the constitutional
minimum standards of protectability, it enters the public domain
293. This does not quite fit the usual local-protectionism profile of dormant Commerce
Clause cases, as firm Y may not be based or incorporated in the protecting state. This is not a
problem for two reasons. First, the term "local" may have many definitions. Consider the
Florida statute held unconstitutionally protectionist even though it "[c]ould also apply to locally
organized bank holding companies, if they maintained their principal operations outside the State
• . . [because] [d]iscrimination based on the extent of local operations is itself enough to establish
the kind of local protectionism..." barred by the dormant Commerce Clause. Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 42 n.9 (1980). Choosing local trademark registration
may be sufficient to be "local" for dormant Commerce Clause purposes. Second, and more
importantly, the functional trademark problem is better addressed under what Donald H. Regan
calls a "national interest," rather than a "movement of goods" dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. See discussion, infra notes 305-11 and accompanying text.
294. A variation on this problem is presented by plaintiffs seeking extra-state injunctions
against the use of trademarks which violate state antidilution laws. See, e.g., Mead Data Central,
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 702 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). David Welkowitz argues that multi-state injunctions for state
torts, including dilution, are improper because "[t]here appears to be a constitutionally mandated
(though perhaps only impliedly so) structure that prohibits certain extensions of state power. It
is not a balancing of the interests of several states; it is a limit that per se exists to restrict power
in the federal system of interstate relations." David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality,
and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1992). Welkowitz discusses
several lines of Court cases including those under the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 30-40.
295. I make this assumption to target the right, not the remedy. Cf. Welkowitz, supra note
294 (analyzing problems with extrastate remedies). If the state also issues an extra-territorial
injunction, the added remedy cannot sanitize the importation ban.
296. But see Nicklin, supra note 106, at 294-97 (stating that Congress is constitutionally
required to protect authors and inventors, including foreign authors and inventors not residing
in the United States).
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immediately. But whenever it enters the public domain, free-riding by
the public is a constitutional mandate.297  In this hypothetical
situation, the over-protecting state protects the res longer than does
federal statute. The protecting state's law permanently prevents all
donees from using the dedicated res inside the protecting state, thus
undercutting the federal scheme.
Possibility two: Congress does not grant protection, but all states
grant perpetual protection to the same res. If the grants are incompati-
ble with each other, we seem to have a classic dormant Commerce
Clause violation.298 If the grants are compatible, we have the states
functioning as a group to offer a protection barred from the federal
government. I know of no case presenting such an unlikely scenario,
but speaking as a functionalist, I suggest the states would be acting as
if they were the federal government and thus should be barred from
enacting in-concert legislation that Congress is constitutionally barred
from enacting. 99
Possibility three: Congress does not grant protection. Some states
grant protection, but the res is inside the public domain in at least one
state. Any protecting state is barring importation of items from non-
protecting states. Because the protecting state is also barring its own
residents from selling such items, the statute is not expressly protec-
tionist. Thus, the action only falls afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause if "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to local benefits." 3
The only local benefit is that the trademark-holder may retain use
of the goodwill associated with his established mark. This is a benefit
both to the holder of the mark and the local consumers who are saved
297. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 164 (1988) ("Sears and Compco protect more than the right of the public to contemplate
the abstract beauty of an otherwise unprotected intellectual creation-they assure its efficient
reduction to practice and sale in the market place.").
298. See, e.g., Bibb v, Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Illinois statute barring
"conventional or straight mud flap, which is legal in at least 45 States" and required in Arkansas,
violates dormant Commerce Clause); see also Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662 (1980) (state law barring trailer trucks of a length commonly used for long-hauls through
multiple states violates dormant Commerce Clause).
299. This limitation on state action should apply in areas primarily under Congressional
control and in which Congress is constitutionally limited. I am not arguing that in "traditional
state areas" states are barred from enacting similar laws (consider the U.C.C.) nor that in
predominantly federal areas the states are barred from unanimously passing legislation that would
be constitutional if passed by Congress (standard state trademark statutes).
300. Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350
(1994) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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search costs. But the supply of possible marks is quite large"0' and
therefore, the burden of requiring the mark-holder to choose a non-
functional mark is small.30 2 In addition, the only local interest which
counts is the importance of the protection created under state law
which was not available under the existing federal statutes. 3
Furthermore, the state is burdening its consumers with possible
monopoly pricing by the trademark holder, thus making the state's
interest even smaller.
Against this minor, legitimate interest, we must balance the
constitutional choice that functional items should be protected only for
limited times. While this interest would be stronger had the Intellec-
tual Property Clause expressly limited the states, it is still strong. If
the state's intent is to allow a "local" supplier (more precisely, the
holder of a locally registered mark) a competitive advantage by
preventing out-of-state (and competing in-state) suppliers from using
a functional feature, the goal is illegitimate.
How does this suggestion fit into the maze of current dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence? Obviously the answer varies with
one's view on the sense (or nonsense) behind dormant Commerce
Clause cases. I will briefly address only the Court's last garbage case,
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, °" and the only law
review article cited in Carbone, Donald H. Regan's 1986 attempt to
organize the case law.
s
301. At least the supply of possible arbitrary marks is quite large. See, e.g., Landes &
Posner, supra note 17, at 274, 290 (stating that "the distinctive yet pronounceable combinations
of letters to form words that will serve as a suitable trademark are as a practical matter infinite,"
and stating that the supply of "unusual symbols and shapes or combinations of well-known
symbols, shapes, and colors" is "virtually unlimited"). But see Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble
With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 768-75 (1990) (trademark law is based on an unrealistic
assumption that all marks are fungible). While I agree with Carter that marks, even arbitrary
ones, are not as fungible as Landes and Posner assume, I do not think we are facing a sufficient
shortage to justify allowing perpetual, functional marks. However, I have no hard data to support
my assumption.
302. I look at this burden ex ante and not ex poste, in line with court cases that so look at
the choice of a confusing mark. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 22, §§ 19.02, at 23.21[3]
(stating that a junior user has obligation to check possibility of conflict before choosing mark).
303. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1982) (holding that an Illinois anti-
takeover law violates the dormant Commerce Clause) ("We are also unconvinced that the Illinois
Act substantially enhances the shareholders' position.... [T]he disclosures required by the
Illinois Act which go beyond those mandated by the [federal] Williams Act and the regulations
pursuant to it may not substantially enhance the shareholders' ability to make informed
decisions.").
304. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
305. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986), cited in Carbone, 114 S. Ct. 1677,
1695 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). I currently take no position on whether, as Regan argues, the
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Carbone held that a local law requiring all recyclable garbage
picked up inside the town to be sorted at one municipally organized,
but temporarily privately owned facility, constituted a per se violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Carbone calls for standard Pike Church balancing, the type of analysis
used above on state over-protection of a functional mark.3 6 Accord-
ing to the Carbone majority, however, the case against state protection
is even stronger. Under their rule, an "ordinance may discriminate
against interstate commerce" by "depriv[ing] out-of-state businesses of
access to a local market,"30 7 and thus be invalid without balancing.
This possible expansion of the dormant Commerce Clause seems
both ill-conceived and inapplicable to the instant hypotheticals. It is
ill-conceived because I, like the dissent, am uncomfortable with calling
illegitimate any "protectionist" policy much, or all, of whose burdens
fall on in-state actors.308 It is inapplicable because I doubt that such
a local trademark holder would meet the other criteria relied on by the
dissent to legitimize the local ordinance under review-being "essen-
correct approach to movement-of-goods cases is searching for anti-protectionist legislative motive
rather than effects balancing of some type, or Carolene Products type protection of out-of-state
actors who cannot influence the state legislators. Regan is disputing, among others, Vincent Blasi,
Brown, Dowling, and Henkin. See Regan, supra, at 1092 n.1. I choose Carbone and Regan's
article for two reasons: (1) Carbone is the most recent Court case on the issue, (at least when I
first drafted this Article), and more importantly, as the dissent points out, (2) Carbone may signal
a change in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence-a change the dissent sees as violating the
unifying principle suggested in the cited law review article: laws that "offend the [dormant]
Commerce Clause" are those "adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive position of
local economic actors, just because they are local, vis-A-vis their foreign competitors." Carbone,
114 S. Ct. at 1695 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted; partially quoting Regan,
supra, at 1138).
306. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1687 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
307. See id. at 1681.
308. Id. at 1696, 1700, 1701, 1702 ("Subjecting out-of-town investors and facilities to the
same constraints as local ones is not economic protectionism .... An examination of the record
confirms skepticism that enforcement of the ordinance portends a Commerce Clause violation, for
it shows that the burden falls entirely on Clarkstown residents.... [T]he only business lost as
a result of this ordinance is business lost in Clarkstown, as customers ... drift away in response
to higher fees. . .. The Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstown from
themselves.") (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id., 114 S. Ct. at 1688-89 ("Local Law 9, however,
lacks an important feature common to the regulations at issue in these cases-namely,
discrimination on the basis of geographic origin .... Rather the garbage sorting monopoly is
achieved at the expense of all competitors be they local or nonlocal.") (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment). But see Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951) ("It
is immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area is subjected to the same
prescription as that moving in interstate commerce."); accord Regan, supra note 305, at 1230 ("A
government cannot validate discrimination against a protected class (in [the Dean Milk] case non-
Wisconsin firms) simply by subjecting some members of the non-protected class to the same
burden. (A state may not conserve gas by dosing gas stations to all blacks and to whites with odd
numbered license plates.)").
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tially an agent of the [local] government" engaged in an activity
required of local government.
However, Carbone is part of a different branch of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a movement-of-goods case.3" I
would place my hypothetical in the smaller set of "national interest"
cases. The dormant Commerce Clause protects a limited class of
national interests:
[T]hose interests, and only those, that, like the interest in preventing
state protectionism, [the central concern in movement-of-goods
cases], are fundamentally related to the existence and political
viability of federal union. The interest in an effective transportation
network, the interest in protecting interstate commerce from special
disadvantage that flows just from its being organized across state
lines, and perhaps the interest in a uniform national monetary
policy, are such interests.31
[Regan] certainly wants to hold open the possibility that there
are some other [national interests], though there may not be. [He]
do[es] not think there are any other national interests ... that are
recognized [as yet] in the cases, but there is nothing to prevent us
from recognizing hitherto unnoticed national interests in response to
new sorts of state legislation.3"
In Regan's terms, preventing the creation of temporally unlimited
AERs and IERs is such a national interest. The main basis for this
suggestion is the wording of the Intellectual Property Clause. This
sounds slightly suspicious; I am basing a state limit on the wording of
the Intellectual Property Clause after I expressly contended that the
Clause is not addressed to the states. However, this is the same oddity
involved in all dormant Commerce Clause cases.312
309. Using Regan's terminology. See Regan, supra note 305. Regan preliminarily defines
"[m]ovement-of-goods cases a[s] all dormant commerce dause cases except: (1) cases involving
state regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate transportation, such as railroads or trucking;
(2) cases involving state taxation of interstate commerce; and (3) cases involving the state as
market participant ....
Id. at 1098-99 (footnotes omitted). Regan's thesis is that in movement-of-goods cases the Court
should be, and is, only interested in striking down state laws motivated by the desire to advantage
local interests in relation to their out-of-state competitors. Id. at 1206. I take no position on this
thesis, but I find Regan's dassification of the cases very helpful.
310. Regan, supra note 305, at 1192.
311. Id. at 1189.
312. But see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434-35 (1946) ("This broad
authority [over commerce] Congress may exercise alone, subject to those limitations [created by
the Constitution on Congress' powers], or in conjunction with coordinated action by the states,
in which case limitations imposed for the preservation of their powers become inoperative and
only those designed to forbid action altogether by any power or combination of powers in our
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In summary, however one labels the concept, (I prefer constitu-
tional/statutory preemption), my argument reduces to the theory that
a limited field-preemption is built into the skeletal outline of national
information policy contained in the Intellectual Property Clause-with
the possible caveat that Congress must first pass some AER and/or
IER legislation. The federal government may not create temporally
unlimited AERs or IERs. If the states are allowed to do so, they can
make state protection more valuable than federal protection.313 But
the existence of the Intellectual Property Clause shows a constitutional
choice of federal primacy in intellectual property--even if only after
Congress has taken some action in the area. Therefore, the states are
barred from creating such unlimited rights.
My final point is that even under the more permissive dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, Congress is constitutionally barred from
allowing states to grant temporally unlimited AERs or IERs.
314
Congress' ability to override the Dormant Commerce Clause rests on
Congress' power to regulate the involved area.315  But Congress may
not create perpetual AERs and IERs. Therefore, if the states act as
Congress' agents, the states may not violate the limitation either;
Congress cannot delegate power it does not have.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Constitution bars a congressional grant of perpetual, exclusive
rights in both (1) functional trademarks and (2) merely descriptive
trademarks that are simultaneously "writings." The Intellectual
governmental system remain effective.") (citations omitted). I read Prudential as allowing the state
and federal government to combine powers to do any acts separately impossible only because of
the system of federalism-not to allow combination to override other constitutional limits. See
id. at 439 n.52 ("It would be a shocking thing, if state and federal governments acting together
were prevented from achieving the end desired by both, simply because of the division of power
between them.") (citation omitted).
313. Or at least prevent Congress from effectively controlling incentives.
314. Accord Kurlantzick, supra note 248, at 225 ("[Ilt is very difficult to imagine that
Congress can authorize the states to extend temporally unlimited protection when the copyright
clause expressly prohibits Congress from doing it.").
315. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 388 (1983) ("[Clongress should be
able to approve unconstitutional policy choices in state laws when Congress is not constitutionally
prohibited from directly adopting the same policy itself."); accord Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408, 435 n.47 (1946) ("There can be no doubt that the combined exercise of state and
federal authority is limited, to some but largely undefined extent, by other constitutional
prohibitions or the combined effects of more than one."); see also id. at 434 (holding that Congress
may pass legislation allowing state action which otherwise would violate the dormant Commerce
Clause) ("The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely without reference to
coordinated action of the states is not restricted, except as the Constitution expressly provides[.]")
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Property Clause must be applied to the states at least to the same
extent (under one of several alternative theories). Therefore, neither
the federal government nor the states may create such protection.
VII. CODA
The possibility that "limited times" should be interpreted in terms
of the economic life of the res is merely a side issue in this paper.
However, this "side issue" is constitutionally and practically of
overwhelming importance. I strongly urge my economically-oriented
colleagues to investigate it further.
